英文文献：Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule-替代投票规则下的政策极化和战略候选人资格
英文文献作者：Arnaud Dellis,Mandar Oak,Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile
英文文献摘要：
We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, Approval Voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization vis-?? -vis the Plurality rule.

摘要本文利用公民候选人模型研究了替代投票规则下的选举结果。我们表明，就像简单多数原则一样，替代投票规则阻止了多个候选人集群和候选人出现在两个以上的位置。此外，相较于简单多数原则，替代投票规则更倾向于支持政策两极化。这些结果站在与其他获得以下提议投票规则,特别是投票批准,容易候选人集群和,因此,可以支持更大的政策极化相对稳定性方面?简单多数原则。