英文文献：Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?-安全实现实验:防策略机制真的有效吗?
英文文献作者：Timothy N. Cason,Tatsuyoshi Saijo,Tomas Sjostrom,Takehiko Yamato
英文文献摘要：
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria, including equilibria other than dominant strategy equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms. One of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two.

策略证明是社会选择理论中使用的一个标准概念，它要求说真话是一种主导策略。Saijo等人(2003)认为这一概念存在严重缺陷。特别是，许多战略证明机制具有连续的纳什均衡，包括非显性战略均衡。对于策略证明机制的一个子集，纳什均衡集和优势策略均衡集是一致的。例如，当偏好是单峰时，这种双重巧合就发生在格洛夫斯机制中。我们报告了使用两种策略防机制的实验。其中一个具有大量的纳什均衡，而另一个具有唯一的纳什均衡。我们发现，这两种策略在占主导地位的比率上存在明显差异。