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Hart and Moore Contracts Rule Out But not RulE In

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• Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule InOliver Hart and John Moore.pdf

以下文献由armani提供

COOPERATIVES VS. OUTSIDE OWNERSHIP Oliver Hart, John Moore

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=2040&page=32#pid157117

FUTURE OF COOPERATIVES: A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE Bengt Holmstrom
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《现代股份制与私有产权》下载

論文名稱：The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Berle & Means (1932))

-八十年代學者之省思 頁數：47

校所組別：國立中央大學 產業經濟 研究所

論文摘要:　

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.與Gardiner C. Means合著The Modern Corporation and Private Property一書於1932年問世。在該本書中，Berle & Means分別從法律及經濟的觀點對現代公司及私有財產權的演進及其衍生的問題進行研究。其中，Means曾就經濟層面提出了以下三個問題：(10由總體集中度的增加可知現代大公司的經濟地位愈形重要；(2)經營樣，已因所有權的分散，由股東移轉至專業經理人手中；(3)經營者已不再以公司利潤極大為目標，因而與所有者利益相背離。

自此書問世之後，書中所揭櫫的三個課題引起學者廣泛的關注與熱烈的討論。在1982年，值此書出版50週年之際，胡佛研究院曾邀集許多著名的產業經濟學家舉辦了一場盛大的紀念性學術研討會。研討會上，多位著名經濟學家根據Berle & Means 1932年所露重要訊息，在50年後，重作一番省思。針對Berle & Means所提三項研究課題，學者的研究與討論可歸結成以下三點結論：第一、80年代集中度雖因政府的管制而不再提高，但仍停留在一個相當高的水準。至於高集中度所造成的經濟後果，是好是壞，則依然沒有定論。第二、經營權與所有權分離的現象，與會的學者也持有不同的看法。第三、面對經營權與所有權分離所造成的代理問題，與會學者認為企業可藉由核心契約的訂定、公司組織型式的調整、公司內部監控功能的發揮以及企業購併機能的存在獲得改善但無法獲得徹底解決。

隨著50個年頭的逝去，Berle & Means 在1932年提出的問題依然為80年代的學者所關心。進一步言，成就卓越的經濟學者對各個問題仍持有不同的看法。然而，毫無例外地，他們或多或少都受到Berle & Means (1932)一書的啟發或影響。以此角度觀之，The Modern Corporation and Private Property一書之影響力依然歷久不衰。

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-12-19 15:34:46编辑过]

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说明：上面的这个链接是该书的摘要，不是全部内容。

下面这篇文献，由sen提供。

Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations

Jean Tirole

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 2, No. 2. (Autumn, 1986), pp. 181-214.

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=5052&page=6#pid43118

以下文献由sen友情提供

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring, 1988 The Nature of the Firm: Origin, pp. 3-17 R. H. Coase The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, pp. 19-32 R. H. Coase The Nature of the Firm: Influence, pp. 33-47

网友hjh提供

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=11509&page=1#pid60096

The Future of the Corporation

by Michael Novak

1996

试着收费：heavenless、东亚富、一刹春都辅导过了，我想我不至于那么笨或运气不好吧

可惜手上一时没宏观经济学或国民经济学的资料

两篇论文的作者都是Olive Hart。

Financial Contracting

Abstract: This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

Norms and the Theory of the Firm

此文本版已有（nie）

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所有权控制权和激励（陈郁）的英文文献

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=4655&page=1#pid20235

Eugene F.Fama"Agency problems and the theory of the firm"JPE.1980.vol 88

]Harold. Demsetz and Kennth Lehn"The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequenses"JPE.1985.vol 93

Contract Costs and Financing Decisions. By: Fama, Eugene F.. Journal of Business, Jan90 Part 2 of 2, Vol. 63 Issue 1, p71, 21p

中文版文集由一刹春提供，链接https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-249-1-1.html&page=1

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-2-22 23:53:52编辑过]

Joskow，1985：纵向一体化和长期契约（JEL）；

用户qiqitiger友情提供 哈罗德.德姆塞茨：作为一种进入壁垒的广告；

施莱佛等：家族企业，工作论文。

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• Family Firms.pdf

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[此贴子已经被作者于2005-5-14 9:51:54编辑过]

用户seekfuture友情提供

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=14540&page=3#pid89294

Larry提供企业理论方面的经典文献

http://bbs.cenet.org.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardID=92513&ID=34342

下列文献依次为：

Coase_Eca37_The Nature of the Firm

 Alchian,Demsetz_AER72_Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization

Jensen,Mecking_JFE76_Theory of the firm_ Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Klein，Crawford and Alchian_JLE78_Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process

Cheung_JLE83_The Contractual Nature of the Firm

Fama,Jensen_JLE83_Agency Problems and Residual Claims

Fama,Jensen_JLE83_The Separation of Ownership and Control

Grossman,Hart_JPE86_The Costs and Benefits of Ownership_A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration 

 Williamson_JF88_Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance

Hart,Moore_JPE90_Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm 

Holmstrom, Milgrom_JLEO91_Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses_Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design

Rajan,Zingales_QJE98_Power In A Theroy of The Firm

MartinU 提供Schleifer 和 Vishny 的经典 - a survey of corporate governance

这篇经典文章之后，出了一堆的Survey

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=72&page=1#pid120

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Oliver Hart 1995 "Corporate governance:Some Theory and Implications" Economic Journal 105 p678-689

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Hart, Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm

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一刹春友情提供

企业、合同与财务结构_哈特

https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=325&page=1#pid1210

[此贴子已经被作者于2005-7-11 21:42:08编辑过]

Robert Gibbons，2004：Four Formal Theories of the Firm

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Nicolai J. Foss 2005： “The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A Stocktaking and Assessment”

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题目：一个联合所有权理论； 出处：RAND2003

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Power in a Theory of the firm R. Rajan & L. Zingales QJE, Vol. 113, No.2 (May, 1998)

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[此贴子已经被作者于2005-9-28 0:53:48编辑过]

Incomplete Contract Theory(4篇):

Hart, O. and J. Moore (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”, Econometrica 56: 755-785. 版主已经传了。 Chung, T.-Y. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk-Sharing”, Review of Economic Studies 58: 1031-1042. Bolton, P. and M. Whinston (1993), “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance”, Review of Economic Studies 60: 121-148. Tirole, J. (1999), “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?”, Econometrica 67: 741-781. Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (2003), “Incomplete Social Contracts”, Journal of the European Economic Association.

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• Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assur.pdf
• Incomplete Contracts.Where Do We Stand.pdf
• Incomplete Social Contracts.pdf

G-H-M Model

Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny (1994), “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 995-1025. Hart, O. and J. Moore (1999), “On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization”, mimeo, Harvard. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1983), “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem”, Econometrica 51: 7-45.

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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS by Oliver D. Hart NBER Reporter, Summer95, p18, 5p

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[此贴子已经被作者于2005-9-28 0:49:19编辑过]

是啊，这是令人欣慰的现象啊．大家要发扬广大这种精神

谢谢搂主

辛苦