Financial Contracting in Banking (Prof. Bental)

Lectures: 04/22: 8-10 a.m., Room: Alex 5, 10.32 04/23: 2-4 p.m., Room: BU 26, 09 04/28: 8-12 a.m., Room: Alex 5, 10.32 06/16, 06/23, 06/30, 07/07, 07/14: 8-12 a.m., Room: Alex 5, 10.32

New: E-Mail contact to participants

exam:written exam (2 credit points)literature:

Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet: Microeconomics of Banking. See also the course outline.

Bental and Eden (2002): Reserve requirements and output fluctuations Bester (1985): Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information Cooper and Ross (2002): Bank Runs: Deposit Insurance and Capital Requirements Diamond (1981): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring Diamond (1991): Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt Diamond and Dybvig (1983): Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity Gale and Hellwig (1985): Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period-Problem Guinnane (2001): DELEGATED MONITORS, LARGE AND SMALL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMANY’S BANKING SYSTEM, 1800-1914 Jaffe and Russell (1976): Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001): Collateral versus project screening: a model of lazy banks Padilla and Pagano (1997): Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives Sargent and Wallace (1982): The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration Sharpe (1990): Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationship Stiglitz and Weiss (1981): Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information von Thadden (2001): Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: The Winner's Curse recommend:

for 5. Semester or above

downloads: Course Outline Exercise 1 Exercise 2 Exercise 3 Exercise 4