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20190125昨天阅读1小时，累计阅读201小时。

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1.今天你阅读到的有价值的全文内容链接
推荐：《如何获得真正的财富》+《中产阶级如何保护自己的财富》(套装2册)
epub ＆ mobi版 10B，还算值！
https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-6890965-1-1.html


2.今天你阅读到的有价值的内容段落摘录
今天开始读：《宽客人生：从物理学家到数量金融大师》
第1章  因缘际会；第2章  求学7年；第3章  一种生活
……
      我对物理学内容充满激情，但我也对现实回报充满极度渴望。激情与渴望持续多年，尽管失望不可避免。10年后的1976年，作为一名牛津大学的博士后研究人员，我对远大抱负的逐渐消逝有过一次顿悟。在十六七岁时，我曾渴望成为另一位爱因斯坦；在21岁时，我曾认为能够成为第二个费曼就能让我兴奋了；到了24岁时，我认为未来能做到李政道那样就可以了。可到了1976年，与另外一位博士后研究人员共用一间办公室的我，意识到自己已经跌落到嫉妒隔壁办公室的另一位博士后了，只是因为他被邀请去法国参加一场研讨会。非常类似的是，很多期权理论家会提到所谓的“时间衰减”，意思是金融股票期权也会随着到期日的临近而逐渐失去其潜在收益。
……
      由于希望成为理论学者，我面临的选择很少。没有适当的教育，是不可能从事理论研究工作的。我有点羡慕我的那些崭露头角的实验物理学朋友，他们从学徒期一开始就能贡献一些有用的东西——他们可以建造粒子探测器、可以编写电脑程序，还也可以分析数据。尽管从事的都是一些基础性的工作，但毕竟他们有事情要积极地去做。而我们这些理论物理学者则看上去有些令人沮丧的无用和孤独。
      多年后，当我搬到华尔街后，我特别喜欢从事数量金融的那种充实、忙碌的工作方式：总是有程序要写、有交易界面要设计、有计算等着去做。能够有点事忙着，而不是一定要超凡脱俗，这种感觉挺好。
      与此同时，当我在1966年定居纽约的时候，生活水平逐渐提高了。每天早晨我听着WNEW AM频道克莱文和芬奇的广播起床，他们假装在WNEW压根就没有的交通观测直升机上现场直播，其中一个播送打印出来的交通报告，另一个则模仿螺旋桨的声音。直到现在我还能遇到能够回忆起他们没完没了的广告词的人，比如“丹尼森服饰，专为男人打造，新泽西联合区第22大道，早上10点钟到第二天的凌晨5点钟营业，金钱万能，没人走开！”当我听到第22大道的时候，总觉得这好像是克鲁雅克小说中一条带着异国情调的跨国高速路，还有着一点纳博科夫小说《洛丽塔》（Lolita）中汽车旅馆的艳俗。1980年，当我最终决定离开物理学界时，我开车正是沿着第22大道前往位于新泽西州默里山的贝尔实验室参加面试的。这条路一点也不令人失望。
      我喜欢纽约上西区，它有着加勒比海式的气候，也有着充满活力的街区生活。曼哈顿是单身生活的绝佳之地。你可以沿着从哥伦比亚大学通往时代广场的百老汇大街一路走下去，边走边看行人，在Automat牌自助咖啡机——这个牌子的自助咖啡机就快要绝迹了——停下来独自喝一杯咖啡，也可以来一份Hopperesque塞满坚果的快餐，这样永远不会感觉到孤单。每个街区都充满了希望。夏天里炎热的夜晚，国际公寓深褐色房子的台阶上坐满了波多黎各人。我的朋友也是我的同学埃泰·胥奇——一个1956年来美国的匈牙利籍难民——告诉我很多生活诀窍。在完成了整晚的作业后，我们会去第123大道和百老汇大街交汇的地方要一份比萨做夜宵。比萨是一个围着白围裙、身着T恤衫的矮小而整洁的意大利人做的，他常常很自恋地对着镜子梳理他的灰发，而他的妻子胖得出奇，坐在一张窄小的，不知怎么居然能撑得住的铁质折叠椅上怨恨地看着这位意大利人。我记得店里投币点唱机里放的是“世界一片宁静”［There’s a Kind of Hush（All Over The World）］。
……
      尽管为了完成博士论文花费了很长时间，但我并没有真的遗憾过；从某种程度上讲，我为其中的努力而感到骄傲。我在那些年里学到的东西——百折不挠的韧性与数学知识，对我无论是在华尔街还是在学术界都非常有帮助。在任何领域内，只要有人想发现新大陆，他就要花费多年去思考、不断试错、在歧途中徘徊、在误区中跌跌撞撞，最终还要站起来继续前行。从这个角度来说，获得博士学位是一个很好的、痛苦的磨练过程。
      很多年后，我在华尔街吃惊地发现宽客的简历中写着一个并不存在的学位“A.B.D.”，很快我就发现，这是一个商务领域中常用的首字母缩写，代表的是“除论文之外都具备”（All But Dissertation），表示这个人曾经努力去获得博士学位，但在完成论文之前就离开了学术界。由于博士学位是一种研究水平的标志，其主要工作就应该是去完成一项具有原创性的研究，并用论文的方式表达出来。我看着A.B.D.这个词，就好像是看着《反斗智多星》中的“PhD”（注意，不是博士！）。我痛恨这种贬低研究工作中所应付出的创新和努力的做法。
……
      那年夏天，我花了一个月的时间参加了一年一度的埃托雷·马约拉纳[6]粒子物理学夏令营，夏令营是在位于意大利西西里岛西部特拉帕尼省一座山顶上的美丽小镇——埃里切举行的。在山上，我对那些来往于各种会议间、年年夏季都出访的成功物理学家的生活，有了近距离的观察。我和他们中的一些人坐在小镇广场上，吸着纸烟，喝着意大利开胃酒。一天上午，我还在当地理发店里享受了一次颇有特色的修面。我向后斜躺在一个重重的皮椅上，理发师则拿着剃刀在皮带上磨刃。多年后，我碰见过公司律师和华尔街销售员相互吹嘘各自工作中的额外福利——头等舱、昂贵的大餐和别致的酒店。我暗自嘲笑他们仅关注工作提供给他们的物质福利。我认为，在物理学界，生活本身就是福利；在有趣的地方和有兴趣的人谈论物理，就是主菜，而非餐具。
……
       我开始非常清楚地了解自身的局限性。在物理学界遇见的人里，总有些人可以完全超出你的想象。当我在阅读爱因斯坦和费曼的经典论文时，我意识到即使我能够理解并应用他们的理论框架，但我永远不可能自己创造出这样的理论。已经离开物理学界而转入生物学界的我妻子，对这两个领域都非常了解，她说在生物学界即使最聪明的生物学家也不会让你感觉到你跟他不在同一个层次上，物理学界则完全不同。
      我的一位朋友喜欢指出在物理领域和金融领域中各种伟大发现的显而易见之处。这种显而易见是一种错觉，很多事情只有在充斥着成见、迷惑、相互竞争理论的历史环境中传授给你，它们似乎才能被看清楚。金融或理论物理上的每一个很小的发现，其背后都是长期的投入、大量的劳动和艰苦的努力。英国浪漫派诗人威廉·布莱克（William Blake）写道：“改进带来笔直的道路，但没有改进的弯曲道路是天才之路。”我们搞物理的绝大部分人都会成为幸运的改进者，但我们也清楚我们永远不可能成功地跨越弯曲的道路，即使在我们工作中灵光突现之时，我们能够对这种感觉有略微体会。
      即使现在我已经意识到了我的局限性，但我仍高兴地注意到我的命运最近发生了意想不到的逆转。就在几个月前，我还闷闷不乐、准备退出，而现在，依靠已经做出一点成绩的工作，我又兴致勃勃地寻找下一个目标，准备解决一个以前没有人解决的问题。从那以后，即使我的人生起起伏伏，我都努力记住，不管你在工作中或生活中得到的有多么少，你总是能从未来不可知这个事实中得到慰藉。即使身处苦难，没想到的好事或许会不期而至。
……

3.今天你阅读到的有价值信息的自我思考点评感想
      难得的一本书：如果是物理专业以外的人士读这本书，我真是不知道前面这三章能读进去多少。这三章作者以自身的经历为主线，基本上概括了上世纪60年代-80年代近三十年的理论物理发展史，以及在这样的由极盛到渐衰的理论物理学发展过程中，接近顶尖的理论物理科学家的工作和生活，联想到国内各大院校物理系（后多改称物理学院）的师资及招生规模也大至经历了同样的由极盛到渐衰的发展过程。这是市场经济的胜利吗？是求实吗？做为一个物理系的老牌毕业生，能一口气读3个小时，这也是工作多年来的第一次。掩卷沉思，本科时的往事以及当时读到大师们的种种逸闻趣事时的心潮澎湃都从心底的深处淡淡泛起涟漪。往事如烟…..
      好在有了金融工程，之前的数学和物理积累看似有了用武之地，抓紧学习。
      已经有了前辈们的“长期的投入、大量的劳动和艰苦的努力”。通过作者的叙述和思考，我似乎也已经意识到了做为理论物理专业的局限性。对于市场，对于交易，对于人性的了解的种种局限性。如果能够将这些局限性补足，那么就会有不一样的收获吧。
     今天银行股大涨，板块轮动中。
……

单词挑战第2月第15天
seizure n. 没收；夺取；捕获；（疾病的）突然发作
Distress or seizure of property was the mode of satisfaction for breach of contract.
forfeiture 没收
If he should break his day , what should I gain by the exaction of the forfeiture?
waivers自动放弃( waiver的名词复数 ); 弃权证书; 弃权声明书
Use of waivers for expediting resources through customs.
学习坛友单词，一天来3个


1.背单词1个*3-O
2.飞鸟式36个-O
3.Code Practices 1 hr - O
4.论坛收集资料30分钟*2-O
5.Cloud Zhuang45minutes-O

昨日阅读1小时，累计阅读590小时。

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今日阅读2小时，累积阅读6小时。这里资源好多啊好喜欢~~下载了很多喜欢的读物耶

昨日阅2小时，累计阅读533小时

昨天阅读1小时，总计阅读696小时

昨日阅读1小时，累积阅读1119小时

1、文章链接：https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3474091

2、文章摘录：简单来说，高盛认为，在美联储停止加息后，股市会先受益走高，债市则开始预期加息周期结束甚至未来会降息，这会导致短端收益率下行，迫使收益率曲线陡峭化。

再进一步，市场也会将这解读为衰退已经到来，从而导致股市走熊。

上周一，前美联储主席耶伦曾在全美零售联合会（NRF）年度展会上预计，美国的低利率将维持相当长时间，很可能已经见证了本轮加息周期的最后一次加息。主要理由是：

“如果全球经济出现下行，并且溢出效应影响到美国，就非常有可能（very possible）我们已经见证了本轮加息周期中的最后一次加息。

美国再加息一次或者两次是完美的可能，但没有任何事情处于预设路径。我预计美联储会暂时喘口气，在下一次行动前评估一下目前经济如何。”
而在1月初，交易员们就已经开始全面押注2020年4月之前会降息了。

当时CME联邦基金利率期货显示，交易员们认为美联储在今年3月的会议上有可能暂停加息的概率飙涨（下图），今年加息一次的概率陡然降至逼近零，不可能加息的可能性超过50%，降息的概率大幅攀升至约30%，明年4月前甚至有可能全面降息。

3、文章感悟：美国加息是今明两年国内外专家、学者讨论的热点和重点，美联储加息的幅度、时间与美国、世界经济的发展息息相关。若美国停止加息，一方面股市、大宗商品上行的压力会降低，具有促进作用；但另一方面市场会将这解读为衰退，同样不利于经济的发展。故停止加息的后果将会很复杂。

4、昨日阅读时间：0.5小时。

5、总阅读时间：5.5小时。

昨日阅读1小时，stumble on happiness, 42%->44%，累积阅读8小时

昨日阅读0.5小时，累计阅读16.5小时。

昨日阅读2小时。 总阅读时间93小时

Book of Value - The Fine Art of Investing Wisely 2016(AnuragSharma)

https://bbs.pinggu.org/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=6303889&from^^uid=109341(Page 247-252)

阅读到的有价值的内容段落摘录

Diversification and Modern Portfolio theory

Around 1950, before Markowitz, intuition about the benefits ofdiversification was well established. That this was common knowledge is evident,for instance, in the well-known 1924 book Common Stocks as LongTerm Investments by Edgar Lawrence Smith. But noobjective measures of risk existed at the time, especially for the joint riskof a bundle of investments. So, Markowitz took up this problem as a topic forhis doctoral dissertation in economics and, using concepts from the statisticstexts of the time, formalized the concept of portfolio risk. In particular, hedefined the risk of a stock as the standard deviation of its returns and thenformulated portfolio, or joint, risk using conditional probabilities, orcovariances of returns of all stocks in the portfolio. Of special note inMarkowitz’s equation was the correlation between the stocks in the portfolio.3If the returns correlate perfectly, then portfolio riskcomputes relatively simply and is for the most part

uninteresting, as investors wouldinstinctively know to try to avoid having two such stocks in their portfolio..That is simple enough. But what excited Markowitz was that most stocks did notmove in perfect unison. Subject to the same systemic factors, such as theeconomy and political invironment, correlation between stocks was usuallypartial but almost never zero. It was such imperfect correlations that made thepractical implications noteworthy.

In order to reduce portfolio risk sodefined, investors now had to solve the problem of finding stocks that hadminimal or even negative correlations. But Markowitz went a step further: hedefined efficient portfolios as those groupings in which the proportion of eachstock is such that the portfolio risk is minimal for a given expected return ofthe portfolio. As the number of stocks in the portfolio increased, the numberof terms in the Markowitz equation multiplied fast; calculating portfolio varianceand risk became computationally intense. But, with increasing computationalpower, such math became less and less of a problem. In essence, Markowitz’sgenius was in showing how to lower investment risk, mathematically andspecifically, by grouping unrelated stocks into a portfolio. An implication ofthis formulation was that investors ought to be thinking of risk not in termsof single stocks but in terms of portfolios of stocks. Particularly fascinatingwas the corollary that the risk (or valuation) of a single stock by itselfshould mean very little in large, well-diversified portfolios. The number ofcovariance terms increases as the size of the portfolio increases, and theyovershadow the effect of the weighted variance of any one stock. When you add asingle stock to an existing portfolio of 30 stocks, for example, the new stock adds its own weightedvariance term but also 30 covarianceterms—the covariance of the new stock with each of the already existing stocks.These 30 additionalcovariance terms influence the change in portfolio risk much more than the riskof one new stock by itself.

Twoimplications are usually derived from the math of computing portfolio variance:(1) the risk of a single stock does notmatter that much; and (2) eachbuy or sell decision must be made in light of whatever stocks you already havein the portfolio. As we will see later, the second implication is certainlyvery helpful, but the first implication that the risk of any one stock does notmatter is patently misleading. At the time, though, this was breakthroughthinking, and Markowitz earned a Nobel Prize for conceiving portfolio risk andespecially for delivering the math to make it possible. This way of thinkingabout investing revolutionized finance and is now deeply entrenched in

investmenteducation. One of the early extensions to Markowitz’s work was by WilliamSharpe, with his idea that the risk of a single stock ought to be evaluated inrelation to the overall market risk. Think of a fully diversified investor whoowns a basket filled with all the stocks in the market. To that market basketyou want to add another stock; the issue is the degree to which that additionalstock will increase or decrease the risk of the market portfolio. This concept,beta (β), is simply a mathematical formulation that normalizescovariance between the stock and the market basket (index)—usually approximatedby the S&P 500 Index.This formulation

madeit possible for each stock to have a number, β, that captured its covariance with the overall market. Othermodifications followed, but the core ideas that took hold were that we canapproximate the risk of a stock with a simple statistic (standard deviation)and that we can compute portfolio risk using returns data for each stock in theportfolio.

阅读到的有价值信息的自我思考点评感想

For value investing differs from modernportfolio theory in its focus on subjectively but deeply understanding the wealth-creatingmechanisms of businesses, and the difficulties and uncertainties that managersface as they construct and operate such mechanisms. It is this focus on thebusiness that was the intent of Graham and Dodd and, I’d argue, has been thebasis for the long-term success of many professional investors, includingWarren Buffett. All

these investors clearly recognize that, asEdgar Lawrence Smith had intuitively practiced and Graham had repeatedlyargued, investing is a group operation; spreading the bets intelligently acrosscompanies in a portfolio is sound practice. Markowitz tried to formalize thisidea and got it mostly right in theoretical terms, but the field of finance hasnot quite followed through with a credible and robust way to proxy for thetheoretical chance that investors might lose their invested principal. I submitthat the arms-length mathematical approach simply cannot adequately capture thecomplex of factors that comprise true risk. We need to understand thewealth-creating machinery by getting up close with the businesses in which weinvest.

Diversification will lower the risk of wrong investment,but it will also lower the profit even the investment is correct. Value investingis more concentrate on small number of portfolio. Value investing will concentrateat fewer portfolios. Most people will pick around 5-10 stocks of differentindustries to invest.

昨日阅读0.5h，累计阅读2h

昨日阅读1小时 累计阅读5小时 阅读内容 变量
曾鸣和威廉姆斯把中国企业的创新称为“穷人的创新”。
他们总结出三种“穷人的创新”。
一是整合创新，即通过整合现有的技术，在设计上更贴近用户需求，先从一点实现突破，再用模块化的方式做大规模定制，把原本细分的市场连接起来，一网打尽。比如海尔进军美国市场的时候，先从别人都不做的酒柜入手，把一个原本是高端用户才问津的小小的细分市场拓展成了大众都可以尝试的大市场。
二是流程创新，即通过把廉价劳动力和流水线整合起来，用灵活、低成本的“半自动化”战胜全自动化。比如，同样是生产锂电池，日本企业的一条生产线雇用200名工人，花费1亿美元投资，比亚迪则雇用了2000名工人，只花费5000万元进行设备投资。
三是颠覆性创新，即所谓的“蛙跳优势”或“后发优势”。比如当2G（第二代移动通信技术）升级为3G（第三代移动通信技术）的时候，西门子、爱立信等跨国公司首先考虑的是如何更好地利用自己已有的产品，而华为在2G市场上本来就没有市场份额，所以才能轻装上阵，在全球第一个实现了软交换的3G项目。

昨日阅读2小时。 总阅读时间93小时
Book of Value - The Fine Art of Investing Wisely 2016(Anurag Sharma)
https://bbs.pinggu.org/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=6303889&from^^uid=109341(Page 247-252)
阅读到的有价值的内容段落摘录
Diversification, Modern Portfolio theory
Around 1950, before Markowitz, intuition about the benefits of diversification was well established. That this was common knowledge is evident, for instance, in the well-known 1924 book Common Stocks as Long Term Investments by Edgar Lawrence Smith. But no objective measures of risk existed at the time, especially for the joint risk of a bundle of investments. So, Markowitz took up this problem as a topic for his doctoral dissertation in economics and, using concepts from the statistics texts of the time, formalized the concept of portfolio risk. In particular, he defined the risk of a stock as the standard deviation of its returns and then formulated portfolio, or joint, risk using conditional probabilities, or covariances of returns of all stocks in the portfolio. Of special note in Markowitz’s equation was the correlation between the stocks in the portfolio.3 If the returns correlate perfectly, then portfolio risk computes relatively simply and is for the most part
uninteresting, as investors would instinctively know to try to avoid having two such stocks in their portfolio.. That is simple enough. But what excited Markowitz was that most stocks did not move in perfect unison. Subject to the same systemic factors, such as the economy and political invironment, correlation between stocks was usually partial but almost never zero. It was such imperfect correlations that made the practical implications noteworthy.

In order to reduce portfolio risk so defined, investors now had to solve the problem of finding stocks that had minimal or even negative correlations. But Markowitz went a step further: he defined efficient portfolios as those groupings in which the proportion of each stock is such that the portfolio risk is minimal for a given expected return of the portfolio. As the number of stocks in the portfolio increased, the number of terms in the Markowitz equation multiplied fast; calculating portfolio variance and risk became computationally intense. But, with increasing computational power, such math became less and less of a problem. In essence, Markowitz’s genius was in showing how to lower investment risk, mathematically and specifically, by grouping unrelated stocks into a portfolio. An implication of this formulation was that investors ought to be thinking of risk not in terms of single stocks but in terms of portfolios of stocks. Particularly fascinating was the corollary that the risk (or valuation) of a single stock by itself should mean very little in large, well-diversified portfolios. The number of covariance terms increases as the size of the portfolio increases, and they overshadow the effect of the weighted variance of any one stock. When you add a single stock to an existing portfolio of 30 stocks, for example, the new stock adds its own weighted variance term but also 30 covariance terms—the covariance of the new stock with each of the already existing stocks. These 30 additional covariance terms influence the change in portfolio risk much more than the risk of one new stock by itself.

Two implications are usually derived from the math of computing portfolio variance: (1) the risk of a single stock does not matter that much; and (2) each buy or sell decision must be made in light of whatever stocks you already have in the portfolio. As we will see later, the second implication is certainly very helpful, but the first implication that the risk of any one stock does not matter is patently misleading. At the time, though, this was breakthrough thinking, and Markowitz earned a Nobel Prize for conceiving portfolio risk and especially for delivering the math to make it possible. This way of thinking about investing revolutionized finance and is now deeply entrenched in
investment education. One of the early extensions to Markowitz’s work was by William Sharpe, with his idea that the risk of a single stock ought to be evaluated in relation to the overall market risk. Think of a fully diversified investor who owns a basket filled with all the stocks in the market. To that market basket you want to add another stock; the issue is the degree to which that additional stock will increase or decrease the risk of the market portfolio. This concept, beta (β), is simply a mathematical formulation that normalizes covariance between the stock and the market basket (index)—usually approximated by the S&P 500 Index. This formulation
made it possible for each stock to have a number, β, that captured its covariance with the overall market. Other modifications followed, but the core ideas that took hold were that we can approximate the risk of a stock with a simple statistic (standard deviation) and that we can compute portfolio risk using returns data for each stock in the portfolio.

阅读到的有价值信息的自我思考点评感想
For value investing differs from modern portfolio theory in its focus on subjectively but deeply understanding the wealth-creating mechanisms of businesses, and the difficulties and uncertainties that managers face as they construct and operate such mechanisms. It is this focus on the business that was the intent of Graham and Dodd and, I’d argue, has been the basis for the long-term success of many professional investors, including Warren Buffett. All
these investors clearly recognize that, as Edgar Lawrence Smith had intuitively practiced and Graham had repeatedly argued, investing is a group operation; spreading the bets intelligently across companies in a portfolio is sound practice. Markowitz tried to formalize this idea and got it mostly right in theoretical terms, but the field of finance has not quite followed through with a credible and robust way to proxy for the theoretical chance that investors might lose their invested principal. I submit that the arms-length mathematical approach simply cannot adequately capture the complex of factors that comprise true risk. We need to understand the wealth-creating machinery by getting up close with the businesses in which we invest.
Diversification will lower the risk of wrong investment, but it will also lower the profit even the investment is correct. Value investing is more concentrate on small number of portfolio. Value investing will concentrate at fewer portfolios. Most people will pick around 5-10 stocks of different industries to invest.

昨日阅读1小时，累计阅读1小时。
昨天开始计划学习，希望我能坚持下去。

昨日阅读1小时，2019年阅读27小时。今天分享一下读《变量》的感受。
整体来说何帆老师的书娓娓道来，很喜欢读，说明文字功底高。我一口气读完了这本书，还是讲感触最深的3点。
1.人生很长，从长远的目标来看，每30年可以做为一个阶段。现在社会发展很快，也要思考阶段里的共性。
2.大趋势与小趋势的关系。众多小趋势影响了大趋势，我们要把握大趋势的方向，努力做好自己的小趋势。
3.任何时代，独立思考的能力很重要。因为环境我们不能完全做我们自己，但是我们不能忘初心，一定要往心之向往的地方走。

1.https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3475959

2.加州公用事业巨头PG&E本因涉嫌引发加州两场大火面临300亿美元的赔偿，将在月底申请破产保护。但在加州官方宣布其中一场与其无关后，公司股价报复性大涨，或许能有“起死回生”的机会.

3.感想：企业的风险管理意识必须加强，像PG&E这样的百年老店一年2个月就能面临破产，这次算是运气好，其实需要反思的地方非常多，同时PG&E是否能够渡过难关仍然是未知数，因为它仍然面对220亿美元负债（超过总资产）

4. 昨日阅读0.5小时

5. 累计阅读13小时

昨日阅读2小时，累计阅读1058小时。

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/looking-back-last-40-years-reforms-china-ray-dalio/


雷达里奥

1、https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-6868041-1-1.html大锅饭是一种社会化的解决吃饭问题的方式
2、大锅饭是一种社会化的解决吃饭问题的方式；当人类社会从农业和畜牧业时代过渡到工业化时代时，社会化大生产便成为新阶段生产力的本质特征，不断以社会化大生产方式取代传统的以一家一户为单位的小生产方式，是社会生产力发展的必然趋势；与生产社会化相应的是人们生活消费的社会化和家务劳动的社会化；大锅饭古已有之；当代社会中的人们更离不开大锅饭；不断以大锅饭取代小锅饭，是人类社会发展的历史趋势。
      每个人都要吃饭。要吃饭，就得做饭。做饭可以有两种方式：一种是以个人或家庭为单位的小锅饭方式；另一种是大锅饭方式。曾几何时，“大锅饭”三个字成了恶名，某些人用“大锅饭”来比喻性地描述一种据说是错误的经济体制的特征，据说，这种以“大锅饭”为特征的体制阻碍了生产力的发展。真的是这样吗？
3、时间能够证明一切，大锅饭尤其优越性，也有弊端。希望大锅饭不要被乱用、滥用，维护大锅饭的权威性。
4、昨日学习1小时
5、共学习23小时

昨日学习2小时，不过感觉没什么进步

今天学习和阅读约5小时，累计阅读约1640小时。
学习和投资心得：
价值投资：凡是进行过投资的人都知道，投资收益=投资本金×（1+投资年收益率）^n，但是不同的人从这个等式中认识的东西不同，由此得到大相径庭的投资结果。要想获得满意的投资收益，我们需要从这三个因素做文章。首先要看投资年收益率（指的是长期年均投资收益率，并非单独某一年），因为投资年收益率为负数的话，投资收益最终会变成0。这个结论让每个坚持价值投资的人明白而且要做到以下三点：1.不能出现大亏损。因为即使连续每年都赚100%，但是最终一年（假设为n年，姑且大于30年）亏损50%，那么前面n-1年都白费了；如果亏损100%，本金都没有了。2.不能连续多年出现亏损。这实际上是第一种情况的变种，只不过是由一年的大亏损转换成为日积月累的小亏损进而酿成大亏损，唯一的好处是可以通过优化投资系统阻止小亏损。3.多年下来的投资年收益率不能低于5%，这是个人估计的年通货膨胀率（个人的判断，并非准确），否则就没有什么意思。毕竟我们投资要一定的追求，最起码要解决一些问题。因为投资年收益率的极端重要，所以上帝也让获得卓越投资年收益率成为一道非常困难的问答题。关于这个问题，稍后还要再进行分析。如果认真思考投资本金和投资年限的话，我们会惊讶地发现几点：1.投资本金和投资年限都是我们的宝贵资源，这是我们为取得投资收益所付出的成本，只不过一个是金钱上的付出，一个是时间上的付出。因此，为了不让我们的金钱和时间白白浪费，每一个价值投资者都应该高度重视和严谨认真对待每一次的投资行为。这就是价值投资的第一个要点。2.投资本金要变大、投资年限要变长，这都需要漫长的时间。这要求我们必须拥有长期视野，保持耐心。这是价值投资的第二个要点。3.在很大程度上我们能够控制投资本金、投资年限，如果说投资本金的控制程度在90%的话，那么投资年限可能在70%（个人认定的，只是用来论证我的观点而已，并不是说一定是这个比例）。投资本金难以控制的因素在于我们投入了不合适的投资本金，比如急用的资金、利息较高的资金，而这在某些时候是我们遭到投资大败的最后一根稻草，也是很多高手失败让人唏嘘的根源，因为倒在了最后的关头，即使他们决策最终证明对了也没有用，因为他们早已被迫平仓或者卖出。而投资年限之所以能够有70%的控制因素，是因为我们可以通过心情愉快豁达、充足睡眠、营养均衡、适度运动、戒烟限酒等方式来提高寿命，以及早入市来拉长投资年限。30%的不可控制因素自然是遗传基因、意外事故等，这些都不在我们控制之内。所以，价值投资第三个要点，就是做能力圈内、成功概率大、能够持续控制的的事情，比如投资本金确保是至少五年不用的闲散资金，比如保持良好习惯、培养长期视野，等等。

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