1 A coalmine operates with a production function q=16√L, where L is the quantity of labor it employs and q is total output. The firm can sell any quantity of coal at a competitively determined price of 20.25. The firm is a monopsonist in the labor market, where the supply curve for labor is w=3L. The coalmine price discriminates, buying labor at two distinct wages. what is the coalmine's profit?

2 A pair of duopolists faces the demand equation. D(P)=6000-5p. Producer A has total costs of 500Ya, which producer B has total cost of Yb^. (Yb的平方) Neither firm has any fixed costs. Assume that the firms had been in a Cournot equilibrium, then firm A becomes the Stackelberg leader. (Firm B takes on the role of follower). Calcalate the change in the deadweight loss that results from this move from Cournot to Stackelberg.