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Devereux M and Schiantarelli F. Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow: Evidence from U. K. Panel Data[M].In R. Glenn Hubbard, ed. Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990,279-306

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