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2011-04-11
Everyone who is interested in derivatives pricing and risk management should read this article. Professor John Hull's book Options, futures and other derivative is the greatest in Finance.  Read the article you will know how THE BOOK is evolving over the time and becomes the favorite derivatives book among college and practitioners.
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Ask any derivatives professional where they first learned about the subject and there’s a good chance they will tell you John Hull’s celebrated textbook, Options, futures and other derivatives.

Heading for its eighth edition early this year, the book has introduced a generation of traders, quants and investors to the pricing and hedging of derivatives. First published in 1987, it has sold several hundred thousand copies worldwide and is virtually unique in selling strongly in both the college and practitioner markets.


For Hull, the Maple professor of derivatives and risk management at the University of Toronto, the success was slow in coming. He remembers the first edition as a slim 300-pager in fairly large type with only 13 chapters – the eighth will have 35. This constant updating and development of the book has been key to its popularity, he thinks – sales started to pick up once he began reacting to demand for particular material.


“It wasn’t an immediate success, but over time as the derivatives market expanded, the book expanded with it and sold more as a result. It’s not like writing a book on something like differential calculus, where the subject matter is static. It’s been quite a lot of work, but I do enjoy updating it – it keeps me up to date,” he says.
The level of influence it now holds surprises even Hull. “I sometimes get calls from banks saying they would like me to mention a certain model in my book because it will be easier to get internal approval for it,” he says.


He keeps copies of each edition in his office, highlighted and covered in post-it notes and addenda to help him respond to the roughly 15 email queries a day he receives. Some point out typos or errors, while others ask for help in understanding a particular point. “These are especially helpful because they point to places where maybe I need to improve the presentation of something. The focus is always pedagogical.”


For Hull, presentation is vitally important. Mathematics is only used when necessary and notation is kept to a minimum. “The temptation is to put subscripts all over the place and list all the dependencies of a function, but I try not to do that because it makes it harder to read,” he says.


The last edition was printed in 2007 – before the failure of Lehman Brothers rocked financial markets. As a result, the latest version is hugely expanded, with a new chapter focused on the crisis. One section examines the performance of value-at-risk tools during the period. Using real-world data, Hull shows that a bank using the industry-standard 500-day historical calculation method for VAR on a typical international equity portfolio at the beginning of October 2008 would not have had enough capital for the coming turmoil. A weighting of the data by market volatility led to a much healthier figure, he found.


Hull has previous experience with data collection and its use in business decisions. After studying mathematics at Cambridge and operational research at Lancaster University, his first job was as an executive for Leicester-based British Shoe Corporation. One area of responsibility was to determine inventory using the rudimentary computing technology of the time.


Each pair of shoes had a computer punch card inside, which was filed by the clerk upon sale. These cards made their way back to Hull at central headquarters, who determined how to allocate stock based on the resulting program. “If you dropped the cards it was game over, of course,” he says.


A stint studying operational research followed – first at the London Business School, and then Cranfield University, where he earned a PhD in 1976 while lecturing on business and finance. But it was a move to Canada in 1981 that was the catalyst for a jump into derivatives. As a professor at York University and then at the University of Toronto, both in Ontario, he has tackled several subject areas.


Although most famous now for the interest rate model he developed with his University of Toronto colleague Alan White, Hull started working in general derivatives pricing, with the aim of improving the Black-Scholes-Merton model. He focused first on expanding the scope of that work from equity options to foreign exchange.


“What Robert Merton’s 1973 paper tells you is how to price and hedge an option on an asset that pays a continuous dividend yield. So the idea was to look at a currency as such an asset, with the local interest rate as the dividend,” Hull explains.


While presenting this work to a group of Royal Bank of Canada traders in the early 1980s, Hull was challenged over the success of a delta-hedging simulation. “One banker, I think he was part of their treasury operation, put up his hand and said ‘it doesn’t work that way. You get good results here because you assume a constant volatility, but it actually moves around.’ And he was right.”


This led to an interest in stochastic volatility models through much of the decade, and the development of a research relationship with White that lasts to this day. Their paper, The effect of a stochastic variance on option pricing, introduced one of the first stochastic volatility models to be successfully implemented in the industry.


At the end of the decade, the duo shifted to fixed income after reading a 1986 paper by Thomas Ho and Sang-Bin Lee, called Term structure movements and pricing interest rate contingent claims. That article was the first to really take seriously the idea of calibrating a model to an entire yield curve and then determining the possible arbitrage-free future dynamics. Hull was intrigued by the idea, which was to dominate his research over the next few years.


The main fruit of the labour was the Hull-White interest rate model, a generalisation of Ho-Lee that contained an additional time-dependent mean-reversion term in its governing stochastic differential equation – a so-called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. The additional term was motivated more by a desire to improve Ho-Lee’s calibration performance, rather than a belief that rates move back to an average level – the additional parameter allowed a greater number of curve shapes to fit.


A downside of the model – like Ho and Lee’s – is that as a Gaussian-distributed model, it has a positive probability of predicting negative rates. During the high interest rates of the 1980s and early 1990s, this probability was small – but in today’s low rate environment, it’s likely to be close to 50% when calibrated to the near-zero rates offered by some central banks.


“It’s a drawback, but for years it didn’t matter so much,” says Hull. “It’s really because of the very low-rate environment that it’s become more of an issue. It’s the model’s tractability and the fact it calibrates fairly well that makes it popular.”


The model gives a fairly simple closed-form expression for the short rate and a slightly more complicated bond price formula. Furthermore, long-term average rates are easily seen to converge to the ratio of the mean reversion parameter to the speed of reversion. These simple, functional properties mean Monte Carlo simulation is not required in many situations, and much of the pricing can be done with another of Hull’s favourite tools – the binomial tree.




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2011-4-11 19:02:08
The use of tree methods – the main numerical alternative to Monte Carlo – typifies Hull’s approach to quantitative finance: simple, practical and with a clear objective in mind. “In many ways, our trinomial tree numerical procedures were a bigger research contribution than the interest rate model, because they can be used for any model where some function of the short rate follows a mean-reverting process,” explains Hull.


They are particularly suited to solving problems relating to the early exercise of American options, for which Monte Carlo is prohibitively expensive in computational terms. This was brought to bear in another line of research – valuing employee stock options. Before Hull and White’s work on the topic, employee options weren’t recognised as derivatives and had a separate accounting treatment. They had to be recorded at the cost of a buy-back, at their intrinsic value or at other non-fair value methods, such as the so-called minimum value method – all of which ignore volatility in the underlying.


Hull and White are generally regarded as the first to consider the optionality in a consistent way. In a 2002 research piece funded by the $96 billion Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, they adapted the standard binomial and trinomial tree approaches to take account of the differences in exercise pay-offs – the main one being that the options cannot be traded.


“If you can’t sell the option, it changes the optimal exercise strategy. You probably won’t exercise as soon as it gets into the money, but there has to be a threshold at which you call it. It can make the calculations at each node of the tree more complicated, but White and I tried to come up with a relatively simple model that captures the essence of what is going on. I think that is what we have always aimed for in our research,” explains Hull.


As a result of the ensuing debate, it is now standard practice to recognise employee stock options as derivatives, and both the International Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board require an option pricing model to be used, with a tree method suggested.


In the mid-1990s, Hull turned his attention to the credit derivatives market, inspired by the rapid growth in credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). “It was clearly the next big thing. We got interested in the CDS market in 1997 and from there moved to CDOs. We were just following the market, hopefully helping it solve the problems it needed to solve,” says Hull.


Perhaps the most novel example of their work in this area was a 2004 paper with Izzy Nelken of Illinois-based Supercomputer Consulting. This turned Merton’s 1974 model, which evaluated credit risk by considering the company’s equity as a call option on its assets, on its head. Using implied volatilities from the equity markets, the authors backed out risk-neutral default probabilities.


The credit market ended up being at the heart of the financial crisis, with investors across the globe racking up massive losses on CDOs referencing portfolios of subprime mortgages. Many observers quickly blamed a failure of quantitative models for the losses – with some claiming models were too complex and others arguing they were too simple. Hull rejects the notion that models were responsible for the problems.


“I don’t think models are to blame in any way, shape or form. The people who claim otherwise don’t understand the way models are used – they are not magic predictors, but sophisticated interpolation schemes to price complicated things in terms of simpler things. All are quite imprecise – traders have to adjust for them,” he says. “It’s not models that cause problems – it’s the people who use them. If you use a model you don’t understand or don’t know the limitations of, you can make bad decisions.”
Nonetheless, the crisis has exposed shortcomings – and Hull sees liquidity as one crucial area where models need development. “We still need a good quantitative measure of liquidity risk and better models for it. It doesn’t help that funding liquidity and market liquidity are not always clearly distinguished, as it is their interaction we want to model.”


Regulators are also looking to tighten the rules on liquidity risk, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced two new liquidity ratios as part of Basel III. Also included in the new Basel package, published last month, are new capital charges for credit value adjustment, a counter-cyclical buffer, a new leverage ratio and higher minimum capital requirements. Hull thinks these changes will have a significant impact on banks.


“Basel III will obviously have a huge effect on banks. It’s a move to a more rules-based approach and there are many more rules than there used to be. Unfortunately, I think there is always a danger that regulation becomes too much of a game between banks and regulators and you lose the incentive to develop better risk management models,” he says.


Another major regulatory change is the requirement to clear a large portion of the over-the-counter derivatives market through central counterparties (CCPs). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed into law in the US last July, while the European Commission published its proposals on OTC derivatives last September. Both have central clearing at their heart.


This was the focus of a recent paper written by Hull and published in a Banque de France financial stability review last July. In it, Hull argued a single CCP would increase netting efficiency, but noted it would decrease under multiple CCPs.


“There’s a danger of a proliferation of CCPs, with each country setting up its own and this increases the difficulties in trading. But there may be a subsequent period of consolidation, which could be good for the market,” he says.


Hull feels the systemic importance of CCPs means they cannot be regulated as financial institutions, but should be treated more like utility companies. “Clearly, CCPs have to be as close to risk-free as possible. Otherwise, we are swapping one type of risk for another. Regulators throughout the world should agree on minimum margin levels that are reviewed periodically,” he says.


This is typical of Hull’s most recent focus – on risk management rather than the valuation and hedging problems that have formed the bulk of his research to date. This is actually the topic of his less well-known book, Risk management and financial institutions. “I hope that can do for risk management what Options, futures and other derivatives did for pricing,” he says.


You wouldn’t bet against it.
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2011-4-11 19:25:12
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2011-4-11 19:45:04
thanks buddy, I am a great admirer of Professor Hull ^_^......
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