摘要翻译：
对稳定婚姻问题的某些方面进行了讨论。有两种不同的婚姻计划：完全可转移的情况，即参与者之间可以转移金钱；完全不可转移的情况，即每个参与者对另一个性别有自己严格的偏好清单。我们继续讨论中间部分可转移的情况。部分可转移计划可以作为合作对策的特例，也可以作为完全可转移情况（假承诺）的循环单调性的推广。我们将介绍这两种方法，并对完全可转移和不可转移计划证明稳定婚姻的存在性。
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英文标题：
《Happy family of stable marriages》
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作者：
Gershon Wolansky
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
  Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each participant has its own rigid preference list regarding the other gender. We continue to discuss intermediate partial transferable cases. Partial transferable plans can be approached as either special cases of cooperative games using the notion of a core, or as a generalization of the cyclical monotonicity property of the fully transferable case (fake promises). We shall introduced these two approaches, and prove the existence of stable marriage for the fully transferable and non-transferable plans.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.06687