摘要翻译：
我们导出了一个收益最大化方案，该方案向与等待成本参数相同的客户收取随机费用，以使其成为优质客户。该计划激励所有客户优先购买，每个客户按他/她提取的价格购买。我们还设计了一个关于等待成本参数的异构客户的收益最大化方案。现在，低成本参数的客户被鼓励以较低的价格加入高级类别：考虑到这一点，那些高成本参数的客户将愿意为这一特权支付更多的费用。
---
英文标题：
《An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a queue》
---
作者：
Moshe Haviv and Eyal Winter
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
--

---
英文摘要：
  We derive a revenue-maximizing scheme that charges customers who are homogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter for a random fee in order to become premium customers. This scheme incentivizes all customers to purchase priority, each at his/her drawn price. We also design a revenue-maximizing scheme for the case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to their waiting cost parameter. Now lower cost parameter customers are encouraged to join the premium class at a low price: Given that, those with high cost parameter would be willing to pay even more for this privilege.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.06533