摘要翻译：
离散约束Nash-Cournot博弈引起了人们的关注，因为它们出现在各种竞争性的能量生产环境中，参与者必须做出一个或多个离散的决策。加布里埃尔等人。[“解决离散约束纳什-古诺博弈及其在电力市场中的应用”，《网络与空间经济学》13(3)，2013]声称，离散约束纳什-古诺博弈的均衡集与相应的离散约束混合互补问题的解集是一致的。我们证明这种说法是错误的。
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英文标题：
《A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via
  Complementarity》
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作者：
Dimitri J. Papageorgiou, Francisco Trespalacios, Stuart Harwood
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
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英文摘要：
  Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.01536