摘要翻译：
我使用高等教育信息交换所的一组数据来研究芬兰理工学院申请人的集中分配。我表明，每年都有大量的顶尖申请者不必要地没有被分配到任何项目。有些项目被拒绝的申请人可以接受，但分配机制既阻止申请人申请，又阻止项目录取那些申请的人。一个每年接纳最符合条件的申请人的机制有可能大大减少重新申请，从而缩短进入芬兰高等教育的长队。
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英文标题：
《Why Finnish polytechnics reject top applicants》
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作者：
Kristian Koerselman
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  I use a panel of higher education clearinghouse data to study the centralized assignment of applicants to Finnish polytechnics. I show that on a yearly basis, large numbers of top applicants unnecessarily remain unassigned to any program. There are programs which rejected applicants would find acceptable, but the assignment mechanism both discourages applicants from applying, and stops programs from admitting those who do. A mechanism which would admit each year's most eligible applicants has the potential to substantially reduce re-applications, thereby shortening the long queues into Finnish higher education.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.05443