摘要翻译：
我们考虑了一个组合拍卖模型，其中代理人对成捆物品和付款的偏好不需要是拟线性的。然而，我们限制代理的偏好是二分的。具有二分偏好的代理将对象束集划分为可接受的}和不可接受的}，在相同的支付水平下，她在每个类的束之间无关紧要，但严格地倾向于可接受的束而不是不可接受的束。当偏好域包含所有二分偏好时，不存在不满足补贴的帕累托有效、主导策略激励相容(DSIC)和个体理性(IR)机制。然而，VCG机制的一个推广是帕累托有效、DSIC、IR和不满足补贴，如果偏好域只包含正收入效应的二分偏好。我们证明了这一结果的紧密性：在拟线性二分偏好域中添加任何非二分偏好（满足某些自然性质）都会得到不可能结果。
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英文标题：
《Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without
  quasilinearity》
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作者：
Komal Malik and Debasis Mishra
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions the set of bundles of objects as acceptable} and unacceptable, and at the same payment level, she is indifferent between bundles in each class but strictly prefers acceptable to unacceptable bundles. We show that there is no Pareto efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), individually rational (IR) mechanism satisfying no subsidy if the domain of preferences includes all dichotomous preferences. However, a generalization of the VCG mechanism is Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR and satisfies no subsidy if the domain of preferences contains only positive income effect dichotomous preferences. We show the tightness of this result: adding any non-dichotomous preference (satisfying some natural properties) to the domain of quasilinear dichotomous preferences brings back the impossibility result.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.12114