摘要翻译：
在多个匹配市场中，为了实现多样性，允许代理的优先级在机构的可用席位上变化，并允许机构根据席位的预定顺序以词典方式选择代理，称为（容量受限的）词典选择规则。我们给出了在可变容量约束下基于词典选择结构的词典选择规则的刻画和延迟接受机制的刻画。我们讨论了波士顿学校选择制度的一些影响，并表明我们的分析可以帮助申请在似乎合理的选择规则中进行选择。
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英文标题：
《Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints》
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作者：
Battal Dogan, Serhat Dogan, Kemal Yildiz
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.13237