英文标题：
《A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors》
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作者：
Wolfgang Kuhle
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最新提交年份：
2013
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英文摘要：
  This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent\'s prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the emergence of unique/multiple equilibria. This condition indicates that unique equilibria are played if player\'s public disagreement is substantial. If disagreement is small, equilibrium multiplicity depends on the relative precisions of private signals and subjective priors. Extensions to environments with public signals of exogenous and endogenous quality show that prior heterogeneity, unlike heterogeneity in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria. Finally, irrespective of whether priors are common or not, we show that public signals can ensure equilibrium uniqueness, rather than multiplicity, if they are sufficiently precise.
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中文摘要：
本文放松了Morris和Shin（20002004）在公共和私人信息博弈中的共同先验假设。对于广义博弈，当代理人的先验期望是异质的时，它导出了唯一/多重均衡出现的尖锐条件。这种情况表明，如果参与者的公开分歧很大，则会产生独特的均衡。如果分歧很小，均衡多重性取决于私人信号和主观先验的相对精确度。对具有外生和内生质量公共信号的环境的扩展表明，与私人信息中的异质性不同，先前的异质性为独特的均衡提供了可靠的锚。最后，不管先验值是否常见，我们证明，如果公共信号足够精确，它们可以确保均衡唯一性，而不是多重性。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Trading and Market Microstructure        交易与市场微观结构
分类描述：Market microstructure, liquidity, exchange and auction design, automated trading, agent-based modeling and market-making
市场微观结构，流动性，交易和拍卖设计，自动化交易，基于代理的建模和做市
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