英文标题：
《Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive
  lattices》
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作者：
Ernesto Savaglio and Stefano Vannucci
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最新提交年份：
2014
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英文摘要：
  Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of single peaked total preorders if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants, or equivalently as the behaviour of a certain median tree-automaton. The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold for single peaked domains in bounded linear orders fails in such a general setting. A related impossibility result on anonymous coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules is also obtained.
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中文摘要：
本文列举并讨论了相关文献中两种不同的单峰特性。然后，证明了在这两种规范下，在有界分配格上定义的投票规则在单峰总前序的所有轮廓集上是策略证明的，当且仅当它可以表示为投影和常数的迭代中值，或等价于某种中值树自动机的行为。在这样的一般情况下，对于有界线性序的单峰域，个体和联合策略证明的等价性是不成立的。本文还得到了匿名联合策略证明投票规则的一个相关不可能性结果。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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