Journal of International Economics2022年第6期

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1.Sovereignspreads and the effects of fiscal austerity

主权债务利差和财政紧缩的影响

Diego Anzoategu

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103658

I analyze the impact of austerity on sovereign spreads. To do so I propose a model withstrategic sovereign default and nominalrigidities, where the government follows fiscal rules, which are estimated fromdata. I first study theoretical implications and find that austerity can increasesovereign spreads, or be self-defeating, only when the decrease in government spendingis persistent and the economy is expected to be in a recession with high fiscalmultipliers. I then calibrate the model and use it to predict what would havehappened to spreads and economic activity if Spain had continued to follow itspre-2010 fiscal rule instead of switching to the austerity track. I find that,relative to the counter-factual, austerity decreased sovereign spreads anddebt-to-GDP ratios. Overall, I find that the likelihood of self-defeatingausterities depends on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and fiscal policy, but it is generally low.

我分析了紧缩政策对主权利差的影响。为此，我提出了一个具有战略主权违约和名义刚性的模型，其中政府遵循根据数据估计的财政规则。我首先研究了理论含义，发现紧缩只会增加主权利差，或者弄巧成拙，只有当政府支出持续减少时，经济预计将陷入高财政乘数的衰退。然后，我校准了模型，并用它来预测如果西班牙继续遵循2010年之前的财政规则而不是转向紧缩轨道，利差和经济活动会发生什么。我发现，相对于反事实，紧缩降低了主权利差和债务与GDP的比率。总体而言，我发现自我挫败的紧缩的可能性取决于财政乘数和财政政策的规模，但总体上较低。

2.Macroprudential policy with leakages

存在漏洞的宏观审慎政策

Julien Bengui  Javier Bianchi

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103659

We explore how imperfect regulation enforcement affects thedesign of optimal macroprudential policy. We study an open economy workhorsemodel of macroprudential regulation motivated by pecuniary externalities. Ouranalytical characterization shows that imperfect enforcement generates twoopposing effects. While tighter regulation leads to higher borrowing byunregulated agents, a “leakage effect”, mitigating the increase in fragilitycalls for “squeezing” regulated agents further. Quantitative simulations showthat, overall, a macroprudential policy that accounts for the leakages remainssuccessful at mitigating the vulnerability to financial crises.

我们探讨了不完善的监管执行如何影响最优宏观审慎政策的设计。我们研究了以货币外部性为动机的宏观审慎监管的开放经济主力模型。我们的分析表征表明，不完美的执行会产生两种相反的效果。虽然更严格的监管导致不受监管的代理人增加借款，但“泄漏效应”，减轻脆弱性的增加要求进一步“挤压”受监管的代理人。定量模拟表明，总体而言，解释渗漏的宏观审慎政策在减轻金融危机的脆弱性方面仍然成功。

3.Reserve accumulation, growth and financial crises

储备积累、增长和金融危机

GianlucaBenigno  LucaFornaro MartinWolf

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2022.103660

We present a model that reproduces two salient factscharacterizing the international monetarysystem: Fast growing emerging countries i) run current accountsurpluses, ii) accumulate international reserves and receive net private inflows. We study a two-sector,tradable and non-tradable, small open economy. There is a growth externality in the tradable sector andagents have imperfect access to international financialmarkets. By accumulating foreignreserves, the government induces a real exchange rate depreciation and areallocation of production towards the tradable sector that boosts growth.Financial frictions generate imperfect substitutability between private andpublic debt flows so that private agents do not perfectly offset the governmentpolicy. The possibility of using reserves to provide liquidity during crisesamplifies the positive impact of reserve accumulation on growth. The optimalreserve management entails a fast rate of reserve accumulation, as well ashigher growth and larger current account surpluses compared to the economy withno policy intervention.

我们提出了一个模型，再现了国际货币体系的两个突出事实：快速增长的新兴国家i）经常账户盈余，ii）积累国际储备并获得净私人流入。我们研究两个部门，可贸易和非贸易，小型开放经济。可贸易部门存在增长外部性，代理商进入国际金融市场的机会并不完善。通过积累外汇储备，政府诱导实际汇率贬值，并将生产重新分配给促进增长的可贸易部门。金融摩擦导致私人和公共债务流动之间的可替代性不完善，因此私人代理人无法完美地抵消政府政策。在危机期间使用储备提供流动性的可能性放大了储备积累对增长的积极影响。与没有政策干预的经济相比，最佳储备管理需要快速的储备积累，以及更高的增长和更大的经常账户盈余。

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