瑞典皇家科学院15日宣布，将2007年诺贝尔经济学奖授予美国明尼苏达大学Leonid Hurwicz教授、美国普林斯顿高等研究院Eric Maskin教授和芝加哥大学经济系Roger Myerson教授，以表彰他们在创建和发展“机制设计理论”方面所作的贡献。

　　利奥尼德-赫尔维茨（LeonidHurwicz）生于1917年8月21日，目前为美国明尼苏达大学经济学名誉教授。赫尔维茨在经济学理论方面进行了先锋性的探索，其主要研究领域包括机制和机构设计以及数理经济学。他曾于1990年由于“对现代分散分配机制的先锋性研究”获得美国国家科学奖。

　　赫尔维茨是美国国家科学院、美国艺术与科学研究院成员，同时也是世界计量经济学会成员。他拥有6个荣誉博士头衔，是多家国际著名学术期刊的编委。

《DesigningEconomic Mechanisms》一书相关介绍：

作者：Leonid Hurwicz ，University of Minnesota

Stanley Reiter，Northwestern University, Illinois

出版商：Cambridge University Press (May 22, 2006)

出版日期：(May 22, 2006)

总页数：354 pages

A mechanism is amathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activityis guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are themost familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companiescreate institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so inways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, andthat provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presentssystematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specifiedperformance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism.The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationallyefficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design.When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is aNash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanisminto an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategyimplementation is also studied. Leonid Hurwitcz is the Nobel Prize Winner 2007for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,along with colleagues Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, for his work on theeffectiveness of markets.

Contents

1. Mechanisms andmechanism design;

1.1. Introductionto mechanisms and mechanism design;

1.2. Environmentsand goal functions;

1.3. Mechanisms:message exchange processes and game forms;

1.4. Initialdispersion of information and privacy preservation;

1.5. Mechanismdesign;

1.6. Mechanismdesign illustrated in a Walrasian example;

1.7. Therectangles method applied to the Walrasian goal function-informal;

1.8. Introductorydiscussion of informational efficiency concepts;

1.9. Regulation oflogging in a national forest - an example of mechanism design;

2. From goals tomeans: constructing mechanisms;

2.1. Mechanismconstruction: Phase One;

2.2. Phase Two:constructing decentralized;

2.3.1. Flagpoles-Principles;

2.4.1. Phase Two via condensation: Principles;

2.5. Overlaps;

2.6.1. Main results;

3. Designinginformationally efficient mechanisms using the language of sets;

3.1. Introduction;

3.2. Mechanismdesign;

3.3. Mechanismsand coverings;

3.4. A systematicprocess (an algorithm) for constructing and RRM covering;

3.5. Transversals;

3.6. Coverings andpartitions;

3.7. Informationalefficiency;

3.8. Example 1.9revisited - a graphical presentation;

3.9.Informationally efficient mechanisms with strategic behavior;

4. Revelation mechanisms (coauthored withKenneth R. Mount);

4.1. Introduction;

4.2. Initial settheoretic constructions;

4.3. Thetopological case;

4.4. Proofs andexamples.

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