综述性论文（Surveys）
1.        Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole, 1989, “The Theory of the Firm”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalesee and R. Willig (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland.
2.        Pendergast, C., 1999, “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 7-63.
3.        Lazear, Edward P., and Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007, "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources", NBER Working Paper 13653
4.        Foss, Nicolai J., 1999,"The Theory of the Firm: An Introduction to Themes and Contributions", in Theories of the Firm: Critical Perspectives in Economic Organization, London: Routledge.
5.        Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1991, “Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, 46:255-87.
6.        Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance, 52: 737-87.
7.        Becht, Marco, P. Bolton, and A. Roell, 2002, "Corporate Governance and Control", NBER Working Paper No.9371.
8.        Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach,, 2003, "Boards of Directors and an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature", FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 2003(April): 7-26.
9.        Zingales, Luigi, 1997, "Corporate Governance", http://gsblgz.uchicago.edu, or 1998, the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London: Macmillan, 497-502
10.        Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, Amy Shuen, 1997, "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management", Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533
11.        Chiappori, P. and B. Salanie, 2003, “Testing Contract Theory: a Survey of Some Recent Work”, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress.

交易成本理论(Transaction Cost Economics)
12.        Coase, Ronald, 1937, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4: 386-405.
13.        Coase, Ronald, 1960, "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 3: 1-44.
14.        Cheung, Steven, 1983, “The Contractual Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 1-21.
15.        Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian, 1978, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law And Economics, 21: 297-326.
16.        Williamson, Oliver, 1979, “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations”, Journal of Law and Economics XXII, No. 2: 233-61.

Coase, Ronald, 1992, "The Institutional Structure of Production." A.E.R., vol. 82, no.4, 713-719（该文为Coase在Noble Prize颁奖典礼的演讲）
Williamson, O., 1971, "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations." A.E.R., vol.61, 112-123
Williamson, O., 1973, “Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary considerations,” A.E.R., vol.63, no.2, 316-325
Williamson, O., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free press
Williamson, Oliver, 1996, The Mechanism of Governance. NY: Oxford University Press

团队生产 (Teamwork)
17.        Alchian, A. and Harold Demsetz, 1972, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” A.E.R., 62: 777-795.
18.        Holmstrom, Bengt, 1982, “Moral Hazard in Teams”, Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 324-40.
19.        Lazear, E., and S. Rosen, 1981, “Rank-Order Tournament as Optimal Labor Contracts”, Journal of Political Economy, 89: 841-864.

委托代理理论(Agent Problem)
20.        Jensen, Michael and William Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
21.        Holmstrom, Bengt and P. Milgrom, 1991, “Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol.7, 24-52.
22.        Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, 1990, “Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts”, Econometrica, 58: 1279-1320.
23.        Hart, Oliver and J. Tirole, 1988, “Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics”, Review of Economic Studies, 55: 509-540.
24.        Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, 1994, “The Firms as an Incentive System”, American Economic Review, 84(4): 927-91.

Grossman, Sanford J., and Hart, O., 1983,"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometica, vol.51, 7-45
Harris, M. and Raviv, A., 1979,"Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information," J. Economic Theory, vol.20, 231-259
Holmstrom, B., 1982, “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics. Republished in Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol.66, 169-182
Holmstrom, B., 1979, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell J. Economics, vol.10, no.1, 74-91
Radner, Roy, 1985, "Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting," Econometrica, vol.53, no.5, 1173-1198
Ross, Stephen A., 1973, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem,” A.E.R., vol.63, no.2, 134-139
Spence, Michael, 1973, "Job Market Signaling," Q. J. E., vol., 355-373
Stightz, Joseph E, 1975, "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes toward a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell J. Economics, vol.30, no.2, 552-579

不完全契约理论(The Approach of Incomplete Contract)
25.        Grossman, S. and Oliver Hart, 1986, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691-326.
26.        Hart, Oliver and John Moore, 1990, “Property Rights and Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1119-58.

Tirole, Jean, 1999, “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” Econometrica, vol.67, no.4, 741-781