内容:
福利经济学--中级微观
ZF干预(因为市场失灵)--公共物品和外部性
公共选择与政治经济学(选举问题)中国特色少一点(现在只在村的层面)
赋税归宿以及最优税收理论
社保(医疗,养老)
财政联邦制与地方ZF
Defining the Field of Study
*Narrow def: Public Finance- the field of economics that analyzes government taxation and spending policies (仅包括税收和支出,02-03年翁翕上课内容)
讲中国的税:增值税,营业税,个人所得税,资本利得税,房产税等。各种税率,给不同机构:民企、外企、国企
经济学的origin: 1776- Adam Smith 国富论
欧洲中世纪史:君主缺钱--民主国家兴起后,需要钱发展国家--君主征税--15、16世纪君主需要筹钱 celebrity:Colbert柯尔贝尔(欧洲代表人物)
中国历史上对税收的研究:唐朝杨炎实行两税法以便于增加中央的税收收入,明朝张居正一条鞭法
*Broad public economics def: Public Economics ( Public Sector Economics)- study of government policy through the lens of economics efficiency and equity用工具来研究
经院有财政系,一届里只能有1-2个去财政部,还需要考公务员
Broad Topics
Analysis and design of public policy
Public finance theory and its application
Distributional (从公平角度看)effects of taxation and government expenditures
*Motivation
Why should we be interested in analyzing public policies?
-修身(as a student/scholar)
Subfield related: macro, development, corporate finance, etc.
The empirical tool
-齐家(as a citizen)
如果以后在中国生活--中国的政策无穷多
Economics policies are everwhere and constantly affect our everyday life
Through price intervenes: taxes, transfers, minimum wages, etc.
~ regulation: on what we eat and consume, on the labor mkt, on education, etc.
在美国,可以退税作为中国公民
-治国(as a future practitioner)
满清王朝北大荒——ZF里面清华比较多,当时很多人嚷着从政
Jobs : take decisions affecting others: Social Choices!
*The Size of Government
How to measure the size of government
# of workers
Annual expenditures 广东ZF有很多临时工,但乡长贪污很多钱
Types: purchases of goods and services/transfer of income/interest payment(美国国债)
美国的例子(课本):1970年
欧洲福利高: Sweden France Germany UK Canada
China 数据非常难找,财政部的同学也不知道...
2010, government expenditure 89874.16亿RMB(不知道有没有包括地方ZF),22.6%比美国低,sense:没有那么好的福利
中央直属的国有企业--crucial industries
富士康-郭台铭-雇员数不亚于一些小国
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Game theory, intermediate economics, econometrics: instrument 而不会特别强调针对特别的问题应该如何去应用
Labor economics, industrial economics, international economics
笑傲江湖:令狐冲==独孤九剑--内功不行、老江湖千变万化,所以打不过,他并不知道在什么情况下用第几剑
供给曲线,Nash Equilibrium--用对了地方,就很好
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Case study--报告范本
1. 北京汽车限购令
*Implemented in 2011
*Key: 通过无偿摇号方式分配车辆指标 20-30%(听说)
*Related questions:
Q1-Why should government intervene?
堵车,污染
Fundamental theorems of welfare economics:
Competitive markets are Pareto-efficient and any efficient allocation can be reached by a competitive equilibrium
第一福利经济学定理:完全竞争的市场是有效的 (假设:人是理性的;市场是存在的(common goods是反例) public goods
Then why government intervention?
3 functions of government:
*Creation/ Definition of markets
*Correction of market failures(公共品(道路属于)与外部性(尾气和噪音给他人造成的负担自己不会考虑到))
*Solutions to limited rationality of individuals
*Redistribution
思路举例:对房市的调控
Q2-What are the effects? Did the government achieve its goal?
Direct effects: congestion/pollution is reduced
Indirect effect: distort the choice(扭曲车辆的选择--借钱贷款也会去买豪车)of automobiles; lead to misallocations since some high valuation people cannot get a car; affect car producers and resellers,choice of house(distance)...
Analyzing the Effects:
We need theoretical toolkit to understand the interaction between policies and behaviors:
*Partial equilibrium (攻击需求)/ General equilibrium
*Dynamics
*Uncertainty, etc...
Empirical methods to identify & estimate behavioral responses:
*The welfare loss due to misallocation
*The distortion on automobile purchasing decision
Q3-Are there any better ways to intervene?
基于前两个问题、研究的引申
First need to set an objective--减少资源的无效配置
Then see whether alternative policies (license auction上海牌照拍卖, congestion charge探测到车辆进入重度拥堵地区则自动扣钱London's method, etc.) can better maximize the objective
Compare the costs and benefits of different policies very carefully可以去了解国外如何治理拥挤,进行对比,可以建模型或者引入别人的研究
Government Failure
*Serious problems with government intervene:
-Information: how does government aggregate preferences and technology to chose optimal production and allocation?
-Government policies inherently distort incentives (behavioral responses in private sector)
-Politicians not necessarily a benevolent planner in reality; face incentive constraints themselves
*Creates sharp trade-off
Equity-Efficiency Trade-off
incentive constraints:ZF威胁Amy 行贿,结果Bob没有得到所有Amy付出的,最后的点没有在一条线上