Game theory in Economics

Ariel Rubinstein

Professor of Economics Tel Aviv University

Edward Elgar Publishing Limited

1990年出版

ISBN 1 85278 169 6

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction

PART I NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: BASIC CONCEPTS

1. J.F. Nash,(1950),‘Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA,36,48-9

2. J.F. Nash,(1951), ‘Non-cooperative Games’, Annals of Mathematics,54,286-95

3. H.W. Kuhn,(1953),‘Extensive Games and the Problem of Information’,

4. J.C. Harsanyi,(1967),‘GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY 'BAYESIAN' PLAYERS’

5. J.C. Harsanyi,(1973)，‘Game with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs：A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points’

6. Robert J. Aumann(1974),’Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’

7. Robert J. Aumann(1976),‘Agreeing to Disagree’

PART II REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

8. Reinhard Selten(1975),‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’,

9. D. Kreps, and R. Wilson,(1982),‘Sequential Equilibria’

10. E. Kohlberg and J.F.Mertons ,(1986),‘On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria’,

11. I.K. Cho and D. Kreps,(1987),‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’

PART III FINETE HORIZON GAMES

12. Reinhard Selten(1978),‘The Chain Store Paradox’

13. Robert W ,Rosenthal, (1981),‘Games pf Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox’；

14. D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, and R. Wilson (1982),‘Rational Cooperation In the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’；

PART IV INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES

15. D. Blackwell,(1956), ‘An Analog of the Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs’,

16. A. Rubinstein(1979),‘Equilibrium in Supergames with the overtaking criterion’

17. D. Abreu(1988),‘On the theory of Infinitely Repeated games with discounting’;

18. D. Fudenberg and Eric. Maskin(1986),‘The folk Theorem in Repeated games with discounting or with Incomplete Information’

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