Shavell, S. (1979). Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 55–73. doi:10.2307/3003319

Abstract: This article studies arrangements concerning the payment of a fee by a principal to his agent. For such an arrangement, or fee schedule, to be Pareto optimal, it must implicitly serve to allocate the risk attaching to the outcome of the agent's activity in a satisfactory way and to create appropriate incentives for the agent in his activity. Pareto-optimal fee schedules are described in two cases: when the principal has knowledge only of the outcome of the agent's activity and when he has as well (possibly imperfect) information about the agent's activity. In each case, characteristics of Pareto-optimal fee schedules are related to the attitudes toward risk of the principal and of the agent.




  

授人以鱼，不如授人以渔！

这样的参考文献，那里去找呢？

Jstor等等

我在jstor找的，你看看你们学校有哪些数据库的授权吧，jstor是过刊，新的我也用不上看不懂-_-。

endnote添加ref数据之后查找全文就行，应该能自动下载（和授权有关？不清楚）。我一般用zotero自动下，不过要手动查找。