1 论文标题
The CEO Labour Market in China’s Public Listed Companies
2 作者信息
Alex Bryson, John Forth and Minghai Zhou
3 出处和链接（比如，NBER working paper No.11000）
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1148.pdf
4 摘要
Using panel data for all of China’s public listed firms over the period 2001-2010 we examine
how firms have recruited and rewarded their executives over a decade of huge growth and
turbulence. CEO pay is sensitive to firm performance, although the elasticities are lower than
for the United States and Europe, especially with respect to returns on assets (ROA). CEO
pay rises with firm size and growth, with elasticities resembling those for the United States.
We find no dramatic response to the stock market crash of 2007/08. The elasticity of pay to
stock returns falls to zero after the crash, while  elasticities with respect to sales and ROA
remain significant.  Executive cash compensation  rose steeply throughout the period  – in
contrast to the United States. There are steep gradients in executive compensation within
firms, consistent with tournament prizes, and around two-thirds of CEO appointments are
internal promotions. Within-firm executive compensation rose at a faster rate than executive
compensation across firms, helping to explain why CEO turnover rates declined a little over
the decade. Turnover rates did not spike with the stock market crash. Privatisation and
reforms to corporate governance contributed to growth in executive compensation. A picture
emerges of an executive labour market in which firms are linking pay to performance and
relying on incentive structures within firms to foster executive talent.