<P>Purification of incentive compatible allocations
James Bergin
Department of Economics, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, CANADA
Received: July 31, 2000; revised version: December 2, 2002</P>
<P>
Summary. In implementation theory it is common to consider social choice functions
that map to lotteries over outcomes. For example, virtual implementation
has been used widely with social choice functions that involve randomization.
This paper investigates (in incomplete information environments) the possibility
of purification of such social choice functions, where purification means that the
“replacement” social choice function maps to outcomes rather than distributions
over outcomes, is incentive compatible and generates the same distribution over
payoffs and outcomes as the original social choice function.
Keywords and Phrases: Virtual implementation, Purification of social choice
rules.
JEL Classification Numbers: D71.</P>
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