英文文献：International Agreements, Economic Sovereignty and Exit-国际协议、经济主权和退出
英文文献作者：Martin Richardson,Frank St?hler
英文文献摘要：
We develop a model in which it is uncertainty about the future domestic policy environment that both makes international cooperation attractive and induces the possibility of a nation reneging on such an international agreement. We show, in a fairly general setting in which the likelihood of exit is affected by the degree of cooperation, that the possibility of exit reduces the optimal degree of initial cooperation. “Full” cooperation will never be optimal, and the optimal degree of cooperation will never be such as to “squeeze out” any possibility of exit. However, an increase in global uncertainty may imply an increase in cooperation when exit risks are already large to begin with.

我们发展了一种模式，在这种模式中，未来国内政策环境的不确定性既使国际合作具有吸引力，又导致一个国家有可能违背这样一项国际协议。我们表明，在一个相当普遍的环境中，退出的可能性受到合作程度的影响，退出的可能性降低了初始合作的最佳程度。“全面”合作永远不会是最优合作，最优合作程度也永远不会是“挤出”退出的可能性。然而，全球不确定性的增加可能意味着，在退出风险已经很大的情况下，合作将会增加。