2012诺奖得主Roth & Shapley经典著作3本连发

Roth对Shapley的景仰之情如黄河之水滔滔不绝，曾称Shapley万岁（二进制）。


3本书打包在一起。才发现坛内已有这几本书，重复劳动。
本坛下载地址在此：

Two-Sided Matching.rar
大小:(27.39 MB)

 马上下载

本附件包括：

• Two-Sided Matching.pdf
• The Shapley Value—— Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley.pdf
• Game-theoretic models of bargaining – Alvin Roth.djvu

【1】
Alvin E. Roth, Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor "Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis"
ISBN: 0521437881, 052139015X | 1992 | PDF | 280 pages | 16 MB


Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.

【2】
The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley By Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: C U P 1988 | 340 Pages | ISBN: 052136177X | DJVU | 2 MB

Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume.

【3】
Alvin E. Roth, "Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining"
Cambridge University Press | 1985 | ISBN: 0521267579, 0521022746 | 404 pages | Djvu | 2,3 MB

Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.