英文文献：Minorities and Storable Votes-少数民族和可储存的选票
英文文献作者：Alessandra Casella,Thomas Palfrey,Raymond Riezman
英文文献摘要：
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.

这篇论文研究了一个简单的投票系统，它有潜力在不牺牲总体效率的情况下增加少数民族的权力。可存储的选票为每个投票者提供一笔选票，以便在一系列二进制决策上按需要花费。通过在他们认为最重要的问题上积累选票，少数党偶尔可以获胜。但由于多数人通常能在投票中击败它，所以只有当少数人的偏好程度高而多数人的偏好程度低时，少数人才会获胜。结果是，有了可存储的选票，总体效率要么下降很少，要么实际上上升了。我们模型的理论预测得到了一系列实验的证实:少数人获胜的频率，少数人与多数人的相对收益，以及总收益都符合理论。