英文文献：The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational-帕累式理性的可能性
英文文献作者：Klaus Nehring
英文文献摘要：
We consider situations in which a group takes a collective decision by aggregating individual’s judgments on a set of criteria according to some agreed-upon decision functions. Assuming the criteria and the decision to be binary, we demonstrate that, except when the aggregation rule is dictatorial or the decision rule is particularly simple, such reason-based social choice must violate the Pareto principle at some profile of individual judgments. In the second part of the paper, the normative implications of this impossibility result are discussed. We argue that the normative case for the Pareto Principle is strong in situations of “shared self-interest”, but weak in situations of “shared responsibility”.

我们考虑这样的情况:一个群体根据一些商定的决策功能，将个人的判断集合在一组标准上，从而做出集体决策。假设标准和决策是二元的，我们证明，除了聚集规则是独裁的或者决策规则特别简单的时候，这种基于理由的社会选择在某些个人判断的情况下一定会违反帕累托原则。在论文的第二部分，讨论了这一不可能性结果的规范含义。我们认为，帕累托原则的规范性案例在“共享自利”的情况下很强，但在“共享责任”的情况下弱。