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| Date: | 2013-07 |
| By: | Georganas, Sotiris (Royal Holloway, University of London) Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton) Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7523&r=cbe |
| Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each other's work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we randomize subjects into three groups: in the first one subjects are observed by another subject, but do not observe anybody; in the second one subjects observe somebody else's performance, but are not observed by anybody; in the last group subjects work in isolation, neither observing, nor being observed. We consider both a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on the performance of other team members. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed increase productivity at least initially when compensation is team based, whi le we find that subjects observing react to what they see in a non-linear but monotonic way when compensation is based only on own performance. | |
| Keywords: | peer effects, piece rate, team incentives, real-effort experiment |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | David M. Bruner John R. Boyce |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:13-14&r=cbe |
| This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Specically, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero contributions to property rights are observed without pre- commitment. Positive voluntary contributions are observed with pre- commitment, but are less than predicted. Nonetheless, as predicted, stronger property rights with pre-commitment results in less con ict and more production. The experiment also tests predictions for group- size eects. While average contributions to property rights are un- aected by group-size, mean con ict increases and mean production decreases with larger groups. Key Words: Property Rights; Con ict; Public Goods; Experiments | |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2013-08-11 |
| By: | Marketa W. Halova (Department of Economics, Washington State University) Georg H. Strasser (Department of Economics, Boston College) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:826&r=cbe |
| We describe experiences from integrating a semester-long economic analysis project into an intermediate macroeconomic theory course. Students work in teams of "economic advisors" to write a series of nested reports for a decision-maker, analyzing the current economic situation, evaluating and proposing policies while responding to events during the semester in real-time. The project simulates real-world policy con- sulting with an emphasis on applying economic theory and models. We describe the project setup and how to tailor its theme to current events, explain methods for keep- ing it manageable in larger classes, and document student learning outcomes by survey results and report summaries. Besides improving the learning experience, this project equips economics students to contribute their own views to policy debates and buttress them with tight macroeconomic reasoning. | |
| Keywords: | Teaching intermediate macroeconomic theory, nancial crisis, cooperative learning, team-based writing project |
| JEL: | A20 |
| Date: | 2013-08-07 |
| By: | Guilhem Lecouteux (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00850533&r=cbe |
| Conventional normative economics is built on the assumption that people act as if seeking to satisfy coherent and a priori preferences. This model has however been challenged by many empirical works highlighting the existence of systematic deviations from the behaviour predicted by the neoclassical theory. The development of behavioural economics therefore questions the validity of the results developed by normative economists. Reconciling behavioural and normative economics needs in particular a clarification of the normative content of economic prescriptions, since it appears that the assumption of rational preferences enabled economists to overstep this question, the different interpretations of the current normative criterion of preference-satisfaction leading in fine to the same prescriptions. In this paper, we want to highlight that libertarian paternalism is probably the most natural solution to the reconciliation problem for neoclassical economists, since its current formulation relies on the existence of a rational homo oeconomicus trapped within each individual. We can however find within the current formulation of libertarian paternalism the same difficulties than the ones of Pareto's theory of the homo oeconomicus. We therefore suggest a reformulation of libertarian paternalism based on a normative criterion of individual autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction, and defend its relevance in the specific context of common-pool resources, by showing that the normative prescriptions generated by our principle of individual autonomy present strong similarities with the institutional design principles of Ostrom (1990) enabling a sustainable management of common-pool resources. | |
| Keywords: | welfare economics, libertarian paternalism, homo oeconomicus, nudge, autonomy, common-pool resources |
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | Caria, Antonia Stefano Hassen, Ibrahim Worku |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1282&r=cbe |
| In this study we focus on exclusion from job contact networks, which constitutes a major disadvantage for labor market participants in settings where referral hiring is common and information about jobs hard to obtain. In a mid-size town in northern Ethiopia, where these mechanisms are at work, we observe that many individuals do not access local job contact networks. Models of strategic network formation and behavioral decision theory suggest that given the right incentives, job contact networks should be more inclusive. On these grounds we hypothesize that workers would link to peripheral peers when this maximizes their chances of referral and when self-regarding concerns are absent due to social preferences. | |
| Keywords: | social network, Labor market, field experiment, |
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:warwcg:142&r=cbe |
| Cooperating and trusting behavior may be explained by preferences over social outcomes (people care about others, are unselfish and help- ful), or attitudes to work and social responsibilities (plans have to be carried out, norms have to be followed). If the first hypothesis is true, Agreeable- ness, reporting stated empathy for others, should matter most; if the second, higher score in traits expressing attitude to work, intrinsic motivation (Con- scientiousness) should be correlated with cooperating behavior and trust. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis when subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing by whether others' payment is affected. | |
| Keywords: | Personality Traits, Cooperation, Effort Provision |
| Date: | 2013 |
| By: | Xing, Haipeng Zhang, Xiaobo |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1273&r=cbe |
| In this paper, we argue that economists can learn a great deal from the design principles implemented in medical research. We develop a theoretical model to show the logic of adaptive sequential experiment design in the presence of uncertainty over negative effects and discuss how to choose samples in a population to minimize the experiment cost. We also point out the applications of our proposed framework in the economic domain, such as economic reforms and new product design. | |
| Keywords: | Economic development, Economy, Experiments, randomized experiment, Social Sciences, methodologies, |
| Date: | 2013-08-06 |
| By: | Kurt A. Ackermann (Chair of Decision Theory and Behavioral Game Theory, ETH Zurich) Jürgen Fleiß (Institute of Statistics and Operations Research, Karl-Franzens-University Graz) Ryan O. Murphy (Chair of Decision Theory and Behavioral Game Theory, ETH Zurich) |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpsses:2013-05&r=cbe |
| There is accumulating evidence that decision makers are sensitive to the distribution of resources among themselves and others, beyond what is expected from the predictions of narrow self-interest. These social preferences are typically conceptualized as being static and existing independently of information about the other people influenced by a DM’s allocation choices. In this paper we consider the reactivity of a decision makers’s social preferences in response to information about the intentions or past behavior of the person to be affected by the decision maker’s allocation choices (i.e., how do social preferences change in relation to the other’s type). This paper offers a conceptual framework for characterizing the link between distributive preferences and reciprocity, and reports on experiments in which these two constructs are disentangled and the relation between the two is characterized. | |
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