NEP: New Economics Papers
Experimental Economics

Edited by:	Daniel Houser
	George Mason University
Issue date:	2013-10-18
Papers:	30

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NEP is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Victoria University of Wellington.
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In this issue we have:

• One Swallow Doesn’t Make a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring EffectsZacharias Maniadis; Fabio Tufano; John A List
  
• Self-Control, Commitment and Peer Pressure: A Laboratory ExperimentAurélie Bonein; Laurent Denant-Boèmont
  
• The role of information in tax compliance: Evidence from a natural field experimentTuomas Kosonen; Olli Ropponen
  
• Why Real Leisure Really Matters: Incentive Effects on Real Effort in the Laboratory.Brice Corgnet; Roberto Hernán-González; Eric Schniter
  
• The Social EgoistBoschini, Anne; Muren, Astri; Persson, Mats
  
• Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental EvidenceRobert Shupp; Roman M. Sheremeta; David Schmidt; James Walker
  
• Risk taking in diverse groups: Gender mattersJeroen Nieboer
  
• Workers' propensity to cooperate with colleagues and the general population: a comparison based on a field experimentGiacomo Degli Antoni
  
• Endogenous group formation in experimental contestsHerbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
  
• Limitations to Signaling Trust with All or Nothing InvestmentsEric Schniter; Roman M. Sheremeta; Timothy W. Shields
  
• Social preferences and portfolio choiceRiedl A.M.; Smeets P.M.A.
  
• When You Know Your Neighbor Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects, and Tax ComplianceJames Alm; Kim M. Bloomquist; Michael McKee
  
• Measuring Time and Risk Preferences: Reliability, Stability, Domain SpecificityRiedl A.M.; Wölbert E.M.
  
• Separating attitudes towards money from attitudes towards probabilities: Stake effects and ambiguity as a test for prospect theoryVieider, Ferdinand M.; Cingl, Lubomír; Martinsson, Peter; Stojic, Hrvoje
  
• The Interrogation Game: Using Coercion and Rewards to Elicit Information from GroupsDavid Johnson; John Ryan
  
• Taking the Well-being of Future Generations Seriously : Do People Contribute More to Intra-temporal or Inter-temporal Public Goods?Grolleau , Gilles G.; Sutan, Angela; Vranceanu, Radu
  
• Efficient tax reporting: The effects of taxpayer information servicesChristian A. Vossler; Michael McKee
  
• Incentivizing Cooperative Agreements for Sustainable Forest Management: Experimental Tests of Alternative Structures and Institutional RulesDavid McEvoy; Michael Jones; Michael McKee; John Talberth
  
• Ideology, Deliberation and Persuasion within Small Groups: A Randomized Field Experiment on Fiscal PolicyEsterling, Kevin M.; Fung, Archon; Lee, Taeku
  
• Collective Dangerous Behavior: Theory and Evidence on Risk-TakingOlivier Bochet; Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti; Justin Leroux; Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
  
• Risk taking and risk sharing does responsibility matter?Tausch F.; Cettolin E.
  
• Unresponsive and Unpersuaded: The Unintended Consequences of Voter Persuasion EffortsBailey, Michael; Hopkins, Daniel J.; Rogers, Todd
  
• Ambiguity in Performance Pay: An Online ExperimentDavid Johnson; David Cooper
  
• Do Financial Incentives Increase the Use of Electronic Health Records? Findings from an Experiment.Lorenzo Moreno; Suzanne Felt-Lisk; Stacy Dale
  
• Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group SizeDaniele Nosenzo; Simone Quercia; Martin Sefton
  
• Water Cooler Ostracism: Social Exclusion as a Punishment MechanismDavid Johnson; Brent Davis
  
• Participatory Accountability and Collective Action: Experimental Evidence from AlbaniaAbigail Barr; Truman Packard; Danila Serra
  
• Patience and Time Consistency in Collective DecisionsLaurent Denant-Boèmont; Enrico Diecidue; Olivier L'Haridon
  
• Optimal Contracting with Altruism and ReciprocityMatteo Bassi; Marco Pagnozzi; Salvatore Piccolo
  
• Alliances in the Shadow of ConflictKe, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian