英文文献：Vertical Integration in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusive Provision and Program Quality-双向市场的垂直整合:独家供应和节目质量
英文文献作者：Anna D'Annunzio
英文文献摘要：
We study distribution and investment in content quality in a two-sided media market. We show that a content provider prefers to provide the premium content exclusively to a platform, no matter what the vertical structure of the industry is. However, a vertically integrated content provider has fewer incentives to invest in quality than an independent one. When downstream platforms are asymmetric, the platform with a competitive advantage on the advertising market gets the exclusive content and the content provider invests even less in quality when it is integrated with it. When we endogenize the vertical structure of the industry, we find that the content provider acquires the platform with a competitive advantage on the advertisers market. Vertical integration reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare. Our results suggest that, in merger control,authorities should carefully assess the effects of the integration on the incentives to invest in content quality. Moreover, a policy intervention at the distribution stage that enforces non-exclusive provision might have adverse effects on consumer surplus and welfare. Also advertising cap could have the effect of reducing quality.

我们研究了双面媒体市场中内容质量的分配和投资。我们的研究表明，无论行业的垂直结构如何，内容提供商都倾向于只向一个平台提供优质内容。然而，与独立内容提供商相比，垂直整合内容提供商在质量方面的投资动机更少。当下游平台不对称时，在广告市场具有竞争优势的平台获得独家内容，而内容提供商在与之整合时，在质量上投入更少。当产业的垂直结构内化时，我们发现内容提供者获得的平台在广告客户市场上具有竞争优势。纵向一体化减少了消费者剩余和总福利。我们的研究结果表明，在并购控制方面，当局应仔细评估整合对激励内容质量投资的影响。此外，在分配阶段实施非排他性提供的政策干预可能对消费者剩余和福利产生不利影响。此外，广告上限可能有降低质量的影响。