英文文献：Strategic voting in proportional representation systems-比例代表制中的战略投票
英文文献作者：Stan Veuger,Tim Ganser
英文文献摘要：
We propose a model of voter decision-making in proportional representation systems: ultra-rational strategic voters construct expectations of coalitions and policy outcomes based on expected seat distributions and vote to maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy. We examine the predictions of our model using data from the Netherlands and successfully predict the voting behavior of significant numbers of voters. Nevertheless, other factors matter more than our strategic prediction. Three main take-aways follow: (1) At least to some extent, voters seem to take complex coalition considerations into account. (2) There is a need for large-scale quantitative studies about voter decision-making in proportional representation systems. (3) Narrowly defined strategic voting might matter less in proportional representation systems than in plurality systems.

本文提出了比例代表制下选民决策的模型:超理性的策略性选民根据预期的席位分配，建构对联合政府和政策结果的预期，并通过投票来最大化他们对政策实施的预期效用。我们使用来自荷兰的数据检验了我们的模型的预测，并成功地预测了大量选民的投票行为。然而，其他因素比我们的战略预测更重要。以下是三个主要结论:(1)至少在某种程度上，选民似乎会考虑复杂的联合政府因素。(2)有必要对比例代表制下的选民决策进行大规模定量研究。(3)狭隘定义的战略投票在比例代表制中可能没有在简单多数制中那么重要。