<p><strong>Differential Information Economies</strong></p><p><strong>Author:</strong> Dionysius Glycopantis  Nicholas C. Yannelis </p><p><strong>Publisher:</strong> Springer</p><p><strong>Pages:</strong> 650 pages </p><p><strong>ISBN:</strong>3540214240 </p><p> </p><p><strong>Table of Contents</strong><br/>Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicolas C. Yannelis<br/>Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1<br/>Part 1 Core notions, existence results<br/>Robert Wilson<br/>Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55<br/>Dionysius Glycopantis and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Information, efficiency<br/>and the core of an economy Comments onWilson’s paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65<br/>Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>The core of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73<br/>Isabelle Lefebvre<br/>An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87<br/>Erik J. Balder and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>On the continuity of expected utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105<br/>Frank H. Page, Jr.<br/>Market games with differential information<br/>and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125<br/>Leonidas C. Koutsougeras<br/>A two-stage core with applications to asset maket<br/>and differential information economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135<br/>Stefan Maus<br/>Balancedness and the core in economies<br/>with asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157<br/>Part 2 Core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence<br/>Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin *****ovitz<br/>Competitive and core allocations in large economies<br/>with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173<br/>Fran¸coise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, and Enrico Minelli<br/>Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria<br/>in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185<br/>XII Table of Contents<br/>Stefan Maus<br/>Exchange economies with asymmetric information:<br/>competetive equilibrium and core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203<br/>Part 3 Core, Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility<br/>Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Incentive compatibility and information superiority<br/>of the core of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227<br/>Guangsung Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Efficiency and incentive compatibility<br/>in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249<br/>Beth Allen<br/>Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core . . . . . . . . 279<br/>Tatsuro Ichiishi and Murat R. Sertel<br/>Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm . . . . . . 297<br/>Stefan Krasa and Anne P. Villamil<br/>Optimal multilateral contracts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319<br/>Martin F. Hellwig<br/>Risk aversion and incentive compatibility<br/>with ex post information asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341<br/>J¨ulide Yazar<br/>Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans . . . 365<br/>Philip Bond<br/>Incentive compatible contractible information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377<br/>Part 4 Continuity and stability<br/>Stefan Krasa and Wayne Shafer<br/>Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete . . . . . . . . 397<br/>Gabrielle Demange and Roger Guesnerie<br/>On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419<br/>Douglas Gale<br/>Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441<br/>Konstantinos Serfes<br/>Non-myopic learning in differential information economies the core . . . . . . . 465<br/>Part 5 Value allocations and the bargaining set<br/>R.B. Myerson<br/>Cooperative games with incomplete information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481<br/>Table of Contents XIII<br/>Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>The value allocation of an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . 507<br/>Stefan Krasa and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Existence and properties of a value allocation<br/>for an economy with differential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527<br/>Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, and Benyamin *****ovitz<br/>The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information. . . . . . . . 541<br/>Stefan Krasa, Akram Temimi, and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Coalition structure values in differential information economies:<br/>Is unity a strength? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553<br/>Part 6 Implementation<br/>Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation<br/>in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567<br/>Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, and Nicholas C. Yannelis<br/>An extensive form interpretation of the private core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593<br/>Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir, and Nicholas C.Yannelis<br/>On extensive form implementation of contracts<br/>in differential information economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619</p><p> <br/><br/></p>

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