<p>就是这个……</p><p></p><br/>

[此贴子已经被作者于2008-3-25 22:49:23编辑过]

<p>这个是一篇工作论文。</p>

<a href="http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/research.html">http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/research.html</a>

<p class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">1. <a href="http://troi.cc.rochester.edu/~sgos/oil_paper_7.pdf"><font color="#065c8a">Investor Protection and Over-investment in the U.S. Oil Industry</font></a> (Job Market Paper, 2005)<p></p></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="TEXT-ALIGN: justify;">This paper analyzes patterns of investment, profitability and executive compensation when firms experience unexpected cash shortages or windfalls. It links the variation in these patterns of firm behavior to the level of investor protection. For the paper a model is developed that explains the trade-off between risk and incentives in managerial compensation in the presence of weak governance and investment distortions. The U.S. Oil Industry offers a natural environment to test the model implications because big unexpected swings in prices have generated large unanticipated changes in cash flows. In these episodes I isolate and highlight the role of corporate governance on firm decisions. The main empirical results on investment indicate that: (1) there is over-investment, and the level of over-investment is directly proportional to the available cash. The empirical results on CEO compensation contracts indicate that they are written to restrict over-investment. Data reveal that: (1) changes in cash flows are translated positively to CEO compensation; (2) higher investor protection weakens the positive co-movement of available cash and CEO compensation. </p>

<p>感谢 感谢</p>