The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos
Tversky (1937–1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration.
Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined
their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective
on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky
choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions –
thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection.
I review the older research and some recent developments in light of
two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the intervening
decades: the notion that thoughts differ in a dimension of accessibility
– some come to mind much more easily than others – and the distinction
between intuitive and deliberate thought processes.
Section 1 distinguishes two generic modes of cognitive function: an intuitive
mode in which judgments and decisions are made automatically and
rapidly, and a controlled mode, which is deliberate and slower. Section 2 describes
the factors that determine the relative accessibility of different judgments
and responses. Section 3 explains framing effects in terms of differential
salience and accessibility. Section 4 relates prospect theory to the general