Introduction 1
A Brief Biographical Sketch of Hugo F. Sonnenschein 5
1 Kevin C. Sontheimer on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 9
An Existence Theorem for the Second Best
Kevin C, Sontheimer 11
2 John Roberts on Hugo E Sonnenschein 33
An EquiUbrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible,
Competitive Prices and Wages
John Roberts 35
3 Kunio Kawamata on Hugo E Sonnenschein 55
Price Distortion and Potential Welfare
Kunio Kawamata 57
4 Salvador Barbera on Hugo E Sonnenschein 83
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave
"Too Much" to Chance
Salvador Barbera 85
5 Javier Ruiz-Castillo on Hugo E Sonnenschein 101
Residential Land Use
Javier Ruiz-Castillo 103
6 WiUiam Novshek on Hugo E Sonnenschein 109
Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry
William Novshek Ill
7 Richard M. Peck on Hugo E Sonnenschein 125
Power, Majority Voting, and Linear Income Tax Schedules
Richard M. Peck 127
Contents
8 Andrew McLennan on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 143
Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation
for Walrasian Equilibrium
Andrew McLennan and Hugo Sonnenschein 145
9 Dilip Abreu on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 175
Virtual Implementaion in Iteratively Undominated Strategies:
Complete Information
Dilip Abreu and Hitoshi Matsushima 177
10 Vijay Krishna on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 193
Finitely Repeated Games
Jean-Pierre Benoit and Vijay Krishna 195
11 David G. Pearce on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 213
Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent
Intertemporal Plans
David G, Pearce 215
12 Matthew O. Jackson on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 233
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Salvador Barbera and Matthew O, Jackson 235
13 Marc Dudey on Hugo E Sonnenschein 273
Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods
Marc Dudey 275
14 In-Koo Cho on Hugo E Sonnenschein 295
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
In-Koo Cho and David M, Kreps 297
15 Faruk Gul on Hugo E Sonnenschein 341
Unobservable Investment and the Hold-up Problem
Faruk Gul 343
16 Arunava Sen on Hugo E Sonnenschein 377
The Implementaton of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice
Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result
Arunava Sen 379
VI
Contents
17 Philip J. Reny on Hugo E Sonnenschein 395
On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash EquiUbria
In Discontinuous Games
Philip I Reny 397
18 James Dow on Hugo E Sonnenschein 425
Nash EquiUbrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down
Backward Induction
James Dow and Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa Werlang 427
19 George E Mailath on Hugo E Sonnenschein 447
Jeroen M. Swinkels on Hugo E Sonnenschein 449
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelsonj and Jeroen M, Swinkels 451
20 James Bergin on Hugo E Sonnenschein 481
Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information
Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting
James Bergin 485
21 Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo E Sonnenschein 503
Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships
DanielR. Vincent 505
22 Lin Zhou on Hugo E Sonnenschein 525
Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies
with Pure Public Goods
Lin Zhou 527
23 Zachary Cohn on Hugo E Sonnenschein 541