1

文献名： Perfect Public Equilibria when Players are Patient

作者：Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and S. Takahashi

期刊：Games and Economic Behavio r

卷号及页码：2007, 61. 27-49.

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WFW-4N1SJVG-1&_user=4991442&_coverDate=10%2F31%2F2007&_alid=793394367&_rdoc=2&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=6805&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=2&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4991442&md5=aded1212adbf53fed2876d4a00e03953

2

文献名： Continuous Time Limits of Discrete Time Games

作者：Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine

期刊：Review of Economic Dynamics

卷号及页码：Volume 10, Issue 2, April 2007, Pages 173-192

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WWT-4NC5T73-1&_user=10&_coverDate=04%2F30%2F2007&_rdoc=2&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%237139%232007%23999899997%23647656%23FLP%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=7139&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=8&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=8b3de551d14ea892b2e1bc034a664647

3

文献名：Continuous Time Repeated Games

作者：James Bergin and W. Bentley MacLeod

期刊：International Economic Review

卷号及页码：Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 21-37   (article consists of 17 pages)

电子链接：http://www.jstor.org/pss/2526948

4

文献名：Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

作者：Daniel Cardonaa, , and Clara Ponsatíb

期刊：Journal of Economic Theory

卷号及页码：Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 627-651

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WJ3-4N7RDK7-1&_user=4991442&_coverDate=11%2F30%2F2007&_alid=793394367&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=6867&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=2&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4991442&md5=c19b7d9b2b41e88f1978e4c181b1be2a

5

文献名： The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

作者：Kandori, M.

期刊：Review of Economic Studies

卷号及页码：1992, 59, 581-594.

电子链接：http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297865

6

文献名： The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

作者：Pearce, D. and E. Stachetti

期刊：Games and Economic Behavior

卷号及页码：1998, April 1998, 23, 75–96.

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WFW-45JC9F0-27&_user=4991442&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=4991442&md5=63323a2a6be7978c3af9a89c9156078b

7

文献名：Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

作者：Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine

期刊：The Review of Economic Studies

卷号及页码：Vol. 59, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 561-579   (article consists of 19 pages)

电子链接：http://www.jstor.org/pss/2297864

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