呵呵，讨论有币吗？好，那就要发言了。

楼主的内容我就不看了，要币，不搞。何况标准答案在我这里。

        美国金融危机，我要说两点：
1，金融危机客观上是否可以避免。
     金融危机之所以出现，是美国ZF监管不力，或者说恶意放纵。也就是说只要加强ZF的监管职能，金融危机是可控的。

2，金融危机形成的原因及避免。
     之所以出现金融危机是由于诚信的缺失，或者说放弃了契约精神，简单说来就是每个人都不用为自己行为的后果承担责任。
     具体体现为金融活动中的杠杆比例无限放大，债务关系中抵押制度的放弃。这两点，作为强大的美国ZF及其金融部门对其后果是可以预见的，由此可见，本轮金融危机就是一场有预谋的洗劫行为。
     而杠杆与抵押之中，抵押制度的放弃是引发本轮金融危机的根源。抵押制度是契约精神的保障，是市场经济当立足之根本，由于美国金融机构无抵押贷款的推出，导致整个社会诚信的缺失，都以为借了不用还不用承担责任，反正大家都不用承担责任，大家都不用考虑风险，美国人民没钱买房就借，银行只要有人借就给。
     美国人民为什么敢借钱？因为不要承担责任，只要签字就有房子，再把房子抵押给银行，不用花一分钱，房子就到手，呵呵，sb才不要，因此美国人民一拥而上，  都买房。那么美国银行都是sb？见人就给钱？非也，银行可是私营的，亏钱的事情是不会搞的 ，银行后面可有保险公司兜底，呵呵，谁买房钱还不上，对不起，保险公司买单。保险公司呢？保险公司说，我不怕，我整个家当才值10块钱，他们交保费是1万2万的交，不要白不要，大不了公司给他们，也就值10块钱。因此大家都不亦乐乎，美国房地产也做大做强，特别以两房为主，也就是金融危机时天天说的房地美和房利美。
      但是这样玩下去总不是个办法，因为总有一天玩不下去，不管最后谁买单，都是人民内部矛盾，美国ZF都不好处理这个事。那么最好的办法是别人买单，两房债券的作用就在这里，两房可是美国ZF的企业， 然后美国牵着狼狗 (有11个航母战斗群)，两房债券走向世界，懂味的自己主动买，不懂味的就放狗，世界各国把无数的两房债券都买了（我们买了4000多亿美元）。然后，金融危机爆发了，保险公司说我公司才值1亿 现在要赔付一万亿，我赔不起我破产。银行说我怎么搞，美国ZF说这么大的工程，你一起参与的，没有赚到钱怪谁？实在不行，哥补点给你，亏大了的就破产，和保险公司一样。美国人民呢？美国ZF说，没钱你买什么房，连月供都被没收了，从房子里被赶出来。然后美国ZF向全世界宣布，哥现在不行了，过不下去了，两房债券停止流通。然后，世界各国变了sb。
      整个结果就是美国人民和各国ZF变了sb，美国ZF和地主老财都大赚，呵呵，这就是美国引发的世界金融危机。
      纵观其因果关系，是由美国无抵押借贷的火种，在超级杠杆的吹动下，引燃了世界金融危机的熊熊大火。
      大家觉得该金融危机是不可控的吗？

I used those words last time I addressed you here in New York. It was in 2004, which was 11 years ago, and even more importantly: one major crisis ago! On that occasion, I spoke in my capacity as the chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. I am tempted to ask: how many of you were there? Rich Apostolik, you were there!
At that time, I highlighted the progress and the importance of risk management, trying to convince you that we regulators were on the same side as you risk managers. At that time, regulation was evolving to become more risk-sensitive and to encourage better risk management. Eleven years on, we have all learned a lot more about risks: counterparty risks, liquidity risks – and most importantly, we have learned how difficult it is to identify, to measure and to internalise systemic risks.

I shall not go through all the lessons that we have learned – or perhaps that we shouldn’t have forgotten. Today, I will instead focus on the question I was asked: What is the role of regulators? But before trying to answer that question, let me make two preliminary points.
First: We need to recognise increasing complexity and to adopt a wide perspective in managing risks. We have learned that the economy is growing more complex, more global, and that the interconnections within the financial sector and with the real economy are increasing in ways that are difficult to fully appreciate. We have also learned that risk management itself has a tendency to encourage procyclicality, especially by assessing risks as minimal precisely when they were at their greatest. Moreover, each institution has tended to assess risks without taking into account its own contribution to systemic risks. This narrow view needs to be widened.
In response, regulators have sought to better internalise systemic risk into the regulation and to repair the evident cracks in the framework. A comprehensive regulatory agenda has emerged and, in particular, a macroprudential or systemic approach has become part of the regulator’s toolkit to

Second: We need to take on board the evolving nature of markets and risks. Financial
intermediation and markets evolve, risks evolve and regulators must adapt as well. The need to adopt a
wider perspective, a systemic perspective, and to understand this evolving nature of risk are among the
major challenges for regulators and financial institutions alike.
Keeping these two points in mind, let me turn to the main topic: What is the role of regulators?
I think regulators have three main roles:
First: Complete the regulatory agenda.
Second: Implement regulations consistently and analyse the effects of implementation.
Third: Monitor and adapt to the transformation of risks.
Let me elaborate on each of these roles.
Complete the regulatory agenda

Regulators are in the process of completing the reforms that seek to repair the cracks exposed by the
financial crisis. The breakthrough in thinking is that regulation should go beyond a firm-by-firm view to
take a systemic perspective.1 The reform agenda is a comprehensive one, with national elements
alongside internationally agreed ones. On the international side, let me highlight four main areas:
• Building buffers for both capital and liquidity in internationally active banks. You all know the
drill, so let me just highlight: the step up in the quantity and quality of capital held against riskweighted
assets; the leverage ratio as a backstop to the risk-weighted measure; and, for the first
time, an internationally agreed liquidity standard based on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). These reforms intend to recognise the broader social
costs that insolvency and illiquidity can impose. In other words, to internalise systemic risk.

Time series graph of WorldCom’s default probability from the equity
markets