Contract Theory by Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont

不用多介绍了，这本书是学习博弈论、合约理论、激励理论的必读书籍，能够与Tirole的产业组织理论相媲美的经典教材！

说明：附件中的该书共12章，缺少最后两章，特此说明。仅供学习交流使用！！

CONTENTS:

1 Introduction  1
 
2 Hidden Information, Screening 47
 
3 Hidden Information, Signaling 99
 
4 Hidden Action, Moral Hazard 129
 
5 Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information 171
 
6 Multidimensional Incentive Problems 199
 
II Static Multilateral Contracting 237
 
7 Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions 239
 
8 Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion 297
 
III Repeated Bilateral Contracting 365
 
9 Dynamic Adverse Selection 367
 
10 Dynamic Moral Hazard 419
 
IV Incomplete Contracts 487
 
11 Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design 489
 
12 Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information 553
 
13 Markets and Contracts 601
 
 Appendix 645
 
14 Exercises 647
  

About the Authors

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association.

Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Adanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).

Endorsements
"Written by two pioneers in organizational economics and finance, this remarkable textbook is comprehensive yet accessible. For many years to come it will be a standard reference for students and researchers, from those advancing our empirical and theoretical knowledge in the field to scholars working in macroeconomics, industrial economics, economics and psychology, and other fields in which contract theory has become an important tool."
—Jean Tirole, Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse

"Contract Theory is certainly the most important textbook on the frontiers of microeconomics since Tirole's celebrated Theory of Industrial Organization. Bolton and Dewatripont have done a marvelous job of providing an exhaustive account of the field, using only very simple and self-contained models and relying on a whole battery of economic applications. All this contributes to making the book not only the unavoidable teaching and research reference on contract theory, but also a unique tribute to economics at its best."
—Philippe Aghion, Department of Economics, Harvard University

"An extremely impressive synthesis of the ideas that make up modern contract theory. It will undoubtedly be the definitive text on the topic for many years to come."
—Oliver Hart, Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics, Harvard University
  

[此贴子已经被作者于2009-3-29 19:01:29编辑过]