1

文献名：Rent Under the Assumption of Exhaustibility

作者： Lewis Cecil Gray

期刊： Quarterly Journal of Economics 28 (1914), pp. 466–489.

电子链接：http://www.jstor.org/pss/1884984

2

文献名： The Common Pool, Bargaining, and the Rule of Capture

作者： Smith, James L.,

期刊： Economic Inquiry; 25(4), October 1987, pages 631-44.

电子链接：http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120020213/abstract

3

文献名： Optimal Pollution Taxes and Endogenous Technological Progress

作者： Parry, Ian W. H.,

期刊： Resource and Energy Economics; 17(1), May 1995, pages 69-85.

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFJ-3Y6PD46-P/2/d56e1e80d502d33c564f0e6c47b68589

4

文献名：Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence

作者： Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor

期刊： Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; 19(3), November 1990, pages 203-11.

电子链接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4CYH2YS-K9/2/35448657a605b1a8ae7594ee8f3e1d4b

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