Contents
Preface page xi
Foreword by Evan Kwerel xv
1 Getting to Work 1
1.1 Politics Sets the Stage 3
1.2 Designing forMultiple Goals 3
1.2.1 Substitutes and Complements 6
1.2.2 New Zealand’s Rights Auction 9
1.2.3 Better Auction Designs 13
1.2.4 The FCC Design and Its Progeny 13
1.3 Comparing Seller Revenues 16
1.4 The Academic Critics 19
1.4.1 Resale and the Coase Theorem 19
1.4.2 Mechanism Design Theory 21
1.4.3 Theory and Experiment 25
1.4.4 Practical Concerns 26
1.5 Plan for This Book 31
PART I THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH 35
2 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanisms 45
2.1 Formulation 45
2.2 Always Optimal andWeakly Dominant Strategies 49
2.3 Balancing the Budget 53
2.4 Uniqueness 55
2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction 56
2.5.1 Practical Disadvantages 56
2.5.2 Monotonicity Problems 57
2.5.3 TheMerger–Investment Disadvantage 60
2.6 Conclusion 61



393 页