本人的授课讲义，课作为contract 与机制设计理论的入门资料
ADVERSE SELECTION MODEL
1.        Adverse selection problem with discrete types
1.1        Two types
1.2        Multiple types
2        Adverse selection problem with continuous types
3        Bunching and ironing technique
4        Type-dependent reservation utility and countervailing incentives
4.1        Discrete types
4.2        Continuous types
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCREENING MODEL
1.        A multi-product nonlinear pricing model
2.        The desirability of exclusion
3.        Solving the multidimensional screening problem
4.        Solved examples
MORAL HAZARD MODEL
1.        Linear contract, normally distributed performance and exponential utility
1.1        The optimal linear contract
1.2        The suboptimality of linear contract
2.         the first-order approach
2.1        Grossman’s approach
2.2        Jewitt’s approach
3.        The value of information: sufficient statistic theorem
4.        Discrete actions and output: grossman and hart’s approach
5.        Moral hazard in teams
IMPLEMENTATION THEORY
1         introduction of implementation/mechanism design theory
2         strategy proof/dominant strategy implementation
2.1        Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem
2.2        Hurwicz impossibility theorem
2.3        positive results
2.3.1        majority rule with two alternatives
2.3.2        implementation in restricted domains
3         the VCG mechanism
3.1        Strategy proofness of VCG mechanism
3.2        The uniqueness of VCG mechanism
4         Nash implementation
4.1        Necessary condition: monotonicity
4.2        Sufficient condition
4.3        Some counterexamples
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