英文文献：Price discovery in dual-class shares across multiple markets
英文文献作者：Marcelo Fernandes,Cristina M. Scherrer
英文文献摘要：
We extend the standard price discovery analysis to estimate the information share of dual-class shares across domestic and foreign markets. By examining both common and preferred shares, we aim to extract information not only about the fundamental value of the firm, but also about the dual-class premium. In particular, our interest lies on the price discovery mechanism regulating the prices of common and preferred shares in the BM&FBovespa as well as the prices of their ADR counterparts in the NYSE and in the Arca platform. However, in the presence of contemporaneous correlation between the innovations, the standard information share measure depends heavily on the ordering we attribute to prices in the system. To remain agnostic about which are the leading share class and market, one could for instance compute some weighted average information share across all possible orderings. This is extremely inconvenient given that we are dealing with 2 share prices in Brazil, 4 share prices in the US, plus the exchange rate (and hence over 5,000 permutations!). We thus develop a novel methodology to carry out price discovery analyses that does not impose any ex-ante assumption about which share class or trading platform conveys more information about shocks in the fundamental price. As such, our procedure yields a single measure of information share, which is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the system. Simulations of a simple market microstructure model show that our information share estimator works pretty well in practice. We then employ transactions data to study price discovery in two dual-class Brazilian stocks and their ADRs. We uncover two interesting findings. First, the foreign market is at least as informative as the home market. Second, shocks in the dual-class premium entail a permanent effect in normal times, but transitory in periods of financial distress. We argue that the latter is consistent with the expropriation of preferred shareholders as a class.