Game Theory: Interactive Strategies in Economics and Management
Aviad Heifetz
2012, Cambridge University Press.


Contents
Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games:
1. Strategic form games
2. Representing strategic interactions with games
Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games:
3. Dominant strategies
4. Strongly dominated strategies
5. Weakly dominated strategies
6. Nash equilibrium
Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games:
7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes
8. Concentrated markets
9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty
Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies:
10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance
11. Mixed strategies
12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem
13. Mixed strategies in general games
Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games:
14. Rationalizable strategies
15. Stability of equilibria
16. Games and evolution
17. Global games
Part VI. Dynamic Games:
18. Extensive form games
19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
20. Commitment
21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties
22. Moves of nature
Part VII. Repeated Games:
23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma
24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.