英文文献：Meeting Private Grades And Standards In Transition Agriculture: Experiences From The Armenian Dairy Industry-在转型农业中达到私人等级和标准:亚美尼亚奶业的经验
英文文献作者：Cocks, Jack,Gow, Hamish R.,Dunn, Daniel J.
英文文献摘要：
One of the main trends emerging from the agroindustrialization process is the rise of 'grades and standards' (G&S) in food products. G&S were initially developed by the public sector to reduce transaction costs and ensure product quality and safety but have become a strategic instrument of competition in differentiated product markets (Reardon et al, 2001). Firms are using grades and standards to protect and develop brands in the international marketplace and in some cases to fill in for missing public standards. While producers in developed countries have the resources to meet these requirements, in developing countries these changes have tended to exclude small firms and farmers from participating in market growth, because of the implied investment requirements (Reardon et al, 2001). This is leading to already disadvantaged farmers in these countries being forced to produce basic subsistence food crops and become further excluded from the opportunity to join the global food industry. While past research has evaluated the effects and trends of G&S (Reardon, et al, 2001; Farina & Reardon, 2000; Reardon & Farina, 2002) the organizational structure to enable small farmers to meet these requirements has largely been overlooked. In this paper we use a theoretical contract enforcement framework to argue that private enforcement capital developed through the facilitation of an external aid agency can be an effective means for creating credible and sustainable relationships capable of meeting G&S. We draw upon theory from Cocks and Gow (2002), Oliver and Gow (2002) and Gow et al. (2000) to argue that in situations characterized by high discount rates and low reputation or trust levels (such as transition agriculture) that the use of a third party external enforcement agent can be used to provide the necessary linkage between the parties to facilitate transactions. Through the facilitation role of the external agency, private enforcement capital is developed between the firm and the farmers, opening the path for a sustainable mutually beneficial relationship. Empirical evidence is provided by the case of the United States Department of Agriculture Marketing Assistance Project (USDA MAP) in Armenia and its role in establishing farmer owned milk marketing cooperatives. By acting as an external facilitator in the initial establishment and ongoing development of milk supply cooperatives the USDA MAP has provided a solution to the dual market failure problems of reliable supply of the consistent quality of milk required by processors while enabling farmers access to markets and ensuring timely payment and therefore enabling farmers and firms to credibly contract for the collective marketing of their milk. Through the establishment of a unique and flexibly designed combination of leadership development, training in governance, financial management, dairy management, and quality improvement programs, the USDA MAP has assisted the groups in expanding the self enforcing range in such a manner that the cooperative should be capable of sustaining long term credible exchange relationships once the external agency withdraws. This is important as aid programs have often failed at ensuring sustainability once external management and financial support is removed. Data for this paper was collected through a series of semi-structured interview with USDA MAP staff, dairy processing firm managers, cooperative managers, and cooperative presidents during the fall of 2002, and over a two week period in March, 2003.

农业工业化过程中出现的一个主要趋势是食品中“等级和标准”的提高。G&S最初由公共部门开发，以降低交易成本，确保产品质量和安全，但已成为差异化产品市场竞争的战略工具(Reardon et al, 2001)。公司正在使用等级和标准来保护和发展国际市场上的品牌，在某些情况下弥补缺失的公共标准。虽然发达国家的生产者有资源来满足这些要求，但在发展中国家，由于隐含的投资要求，这些变化往往将小公司和农民排除在市场增长之外(Reardon et al, 2001)。这导致这些国家已经处于不利地位的农民被迫生产基本的粮食作物，并进一步被排除在加入全球粮食工业的机会之外。而过去的研究评估了G&S的影响和趋势(Reardon, et al, 2001;Farina & Reardon, 2000年;Reardon & Farina, 2002)使小农户能够满足这些要求的组织结构在很大程度上被忽视了。在本文中，我们使用一个理论契约执行框架来论证通过外部援助机构的推动而发展起来的私人执行资本可以是一种有效的手段来创建可信的和可持续的关系，能够满足G&S。我们利用理论从公鸡和麻醉品(2002),奥利弗和麻醉品(2002)和麻醉品et al。(2000)认为,在情况的特点是高折现率和低的声誉或信任水平(如农业过渡),使用第三方外部执行代理可以用来提供必要的各方之间的联系来促进交易。通过外部机构的促进作用，私人强制资本在企业和农民之间发展，为可持续的互惠关系开辟了道路。美国农业部在亚美尼亚的销售援助项目(USDA MAP)及其在建立农民拥有的牛奶销售合作社方面的作用提供了经验证据。通过扮演一个外部服务商在最初的建立和持续发展的牛奶供应合作社美国农业部地图提供了一个解决双重市场失灵问题的可靠供应牛奶的一致质量所需的处理器而使农民进入市场,确保及时付款,因此使农民和企业可靠的集体合同营销他们的牛奶。通过建立一个独特的和灵活设计领导力发展、培训治理、财务管理、乳品管理、地图和质量改进项目,美国农业部已协助组织扩大自我执行范围以这样一种方式,应该能够维持长期可靠的合作关系,一旦外部机构退出。这一点很重要，因为一旦外部管理和财政支持被取消，援助项目往往无法确保可持续性。本文的数据是通过对美国农业部地图工作人员、乳品加工企业经理、合作经理和合作总裁在2002年秋季和2003年3月为期两周的一系列半结构化访谈收集的。