英文文献：Risk Sharing in Broiler Contracts: A Welfare Comparison of Payment Mechanisms-肉鸡合同中的风险分担:支付机制的福利比较
英文文献作者：Hegde, S. Aaron,Vukina, Tomislav
英文文献摘要：
Previous research has found that a significant part of risk from poultry grow-out farm operations is due to market price of broilers. This risk is transferred to the integrator when the grower enters a production contract with the integrator. This follows from the absence of a market price variable in determining compensation in such contracts. In more recent contracts a market price clause is included in calculating compensation. We conduct welfare comparison of the old and new contracts and find that while including the market price clause increases the variability of grower income, it also raises grower expected return. Overall, under assumptions of fixed flock size and constant percentage mortality, which enables payment per-pound comparison, new contracts are welfare superior relative to the old contracts. However, when analysis is conducted on a total per-flock payment rather than on a per-pound payment, we find that welfare superiority of new contracts depends on the grower attitude towards risk. It turns out that with higher measures of risk aversion, growers prefer the old contracts relative to the new contracts, while those with lower measures of risk aversion prefer the new contracts.

先前的研究发现，家禽养殖操作的很大一部分风险是由肉鸡的市场价格造成的。当种植者与集成商签订生产合同时，这种风险就转移给了集成商。这是由于在确定这些合同中的补偿时没有市场价格变量。在最近的合同中，在计算赔偿时包括市场价格条款。我们对新旧合同进行福利比较，发现加入市场价格条款增加了种植者收入的可变性，同时也提高了种植者的预期回报。总的来说，在固定种群规模和固定死亡率百分比的假设下(这使得按磅付款的比较成为可能)，新合同的福利优于旧合同。然而，当以每群的总付款而不是以每磅的付款进行分析时，我们发现新合同的福利优势取决于种植者对风险的态度。结果表明，风险厌恶程度高的情况下，相对于新合同，种植者更喜欢旧合同，而那些风险厌恶程度低的种植者更喜欢新合同。