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奥利弗·哈特; 本特·霍姆斯特朗

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He is an expert on contract theory, theory of the firm, corporate finance, and law and economics. His research centers on the roles that ownership structure and contractual arrangements play in the governance and boundaries of corporations.
奥利弗·哈特：
[Biography]
Born in Britain, he earned his B.A. in mathematics at King's College, Cambridge in 1969, his M.A. in economics at University of Warwick in 1972, and his Ph.D. in economics at Princeton University in 1974. He then became a fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge and a professor at the London School of Economics. In 1984, he returned to the U.S., where he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, since 1993, at Harvard University. He was chairman of the Harvard economics department from 2000 to 2003. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the Econometric Society, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He has been President of the American Law and Economics Association and Vice-President of the American Economic Association, and has several honorary degrees.

　　He is an American citizen. He is married to writer Rita B. Goldberg and has two sons and a grandson. He is the son of Philip D'Arcy Hart.
[Academics]
    Books
        Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Press, 1995).

    Selected Articles
        "On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete",Journal of Economic Theory, December 1975,418-443
        "Takeover Bids, the Free-rider problem, and the Theory of the Corporation" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1980,42-64
        "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Econometrica (January 1983) 7-46.
        "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983) 366-82.
        "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Political Economy, August 1986,691-719.
        "One Share-One vote and the Market for Corporate Control" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
        "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" (with John Hardman Moore), Econometrica 56(4) (July 1988).
        "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm" (with John Hardman Moore), Journal of Political Economy 98(6) (1990).
        " A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital " with John Hardman Moore, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1994,841-879
        "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons" (with Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny), Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4) (1997) 1126-61.
        "Contracts as Reference Points" ( with John Hardman Moore), Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 2008,1-48.

本特·霍姆斯特罗姆（Bengt Holmstrom）
1949年4月18日出生于美国，现就职于美国麻省理工学院，与哈佛大学的奥利弗·哈特共同获得2016年诺贝尔经济学奖。
教育经历

　　B.S., University of Helsinki, 1972. Mathematics, physics,

　　theoretical physics, statistics

　　M.Sc., Stanford, 1975, Operations research

　　Ph.D., Stanford, 1978, Graduate School of Business

　　职业经历

　　A. Ahlstrom Ltd., Finland: corporate planner, 1972-74.

　　Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration:

　　Assistant Professor of Systems and Operations Research, 1978-79.

　　Northwestern University:

　　Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics, 1979-80.

　　Associate Professor of Managerial Economics, 1980-83.

　　Yale University:

　　Professor of Economics (Department of Economics), 1983-94.

　　Professor of Economics and Organization (SOM), 1983-85.

　　Edwin J. Beinecke Professor of Management Studies (SOM), 1985-94.

　　M.I.T.:

　　Professor of Economics and Management, Department of Economics

　　(joint appointment with Sloan School of Management), 1994-.

　　Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics,1997-

　　Chairman, Department of Economics, 2003-2006

　　CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvaine; Visiting Research Fellow, 1977-78.

　　University of Chicago; Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, Spring 1982.

　　Stanford University, Visiting Professor of Research, 1985-86.

　　Helsinki School of Economics, Visiting Professor of Management, 1991-92.

　　Stockholm School of Economics, Visiting Professor (recurring), 1996-1999.

　　University of Helsinki, Visiting Professor, Spring 1999.

　　University of Chicago, Initiative on Global Markets, Visiting Professor, Fall 2006

　　Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki, Visiting Professor, Spring 2007

　　Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, Mark and Sheila Wolfson

　　Distinguished Visiting Professor, Spring 2010.
Papers

Banks As Secret Keepers
Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton, Bengt Holmström and Guillermo Ordonez
2016; NBER Working Paper No. 20255

Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets
Bengt Holmstrom
2015; forthcoming in The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics (eds. P. Aghion, M. Dewatripont, P. Legros and L. Zingales). New York: Oxford University Press.

Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System
Bengt Holmstrom
Bank for International Settlements Working Paper No. 479, January 2015 (June, 2014 Preliminary Draft: Presented at The 13th BIS Annual Conference, June 27, 2014, Lucerne, Switzerland)

Video: Econometric Society Presidential Address
LACEA-LAMES, Santiago, Chile
November 10, 2011

The Nature of Liquidity Provision: When Ignorance Is Bliss
Bengt R. Holmstrom
2012; Presidential Address, Econometric Society, ASSA meetings, Chicago, January 5-8, 2012 (Powerpoint Presentation)

Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
Bengt R. Holmström
2005; published in Journal of Corporation Law

The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?
Bengt R. Holmström and Steve Kaplan
2003; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003; also published in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 15(3), 2003

Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
Bengt R. Holmström and Steven N. Kaplan
2001; MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 01-11; also published in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 2001

LAPM -- A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model
Bengt R. Holmström and Jean Tirole
2000; MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 98-08; also published in Journal of Finance,  56(5), 2001

Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective
Bengt R. Holmström
1999; NBER WP6875; also published in Review of Economic Studies,  66(1), 1999; version from 1982's Wahlback Festschrift

The Firm as a Subeconomy
Bengt R. Holmström
1998; also published in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15, 1999

An Economic Theory of Promises
Bengt Holmstrom and David Kreps
September 1998

Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
Bengt R. Holmström and Jean Tirole
1996; NBER WP 5817; also published in Journal of Political Economy, February, 1998

Common Agency and Exclusive Dealing
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
April 1988

On Incentives and Control in Organization, Part 1
Bengt R. Holmström
December, 1977; Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University

On Incentives and Control in Organization, Part 2
Bengt R. Holmström
December, 1977; Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University

Publications

Inside and Outside Liquidity
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
2011; Cambridge: MIT Press

A Theory of Firm Scope
Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmstrom
2010, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (2): 483-513.

Nordics in Global Crisis: Vulnerability and resilience
Thorvaldur Gylfason, Bengt Holmstrom, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström and Vesa Vihriälä
2010; Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. Helsinki: Taloustieto

Comment on “The Panic of 2007,” by Gary Gorton
Bengt Holmstrom
2009; published in Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System
Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2009, pp. 263-273

The Nordic Model: Embracing globalization and sharing risks
Torben Andersen, Bengt Holmstrom, Seppo Honkapohja, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström and Juhana Vartiainen
2007; Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. Helsinki: Taloustieto

Pay Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment
Bengt Holmstrom
2005, Journal of Corporation Law, Summer: 703-715.

The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?
Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan
2003, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 15 (3): 8-21.

Game Theory in the Tradition of Robert Wilson
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom, and Alvin Roth, Eds.
2002, BEPress

Domestic and International Supply of Liquidity
Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole
2002, American Economic Review, 92 (2): 42-45.

Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan
2001, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2): 121-144.

LAPM -- A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model
Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole
2001, Journal of Finance, 56 (5): 1837-1867.

Liquidity and Risk Management
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
2000, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32 (3): 295-319.

Future of Cooperatives: A Corporate Perspective
Bengt Holmström
1999, The Finnish Journal of Business Economics, 4: 404-417.

The Firm as a Subeconomy
Bengt Holmström
1999, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1): 74-102.

Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective
Bengt Holmström
1999, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), 169-182.

The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited
Bengt Holmström and John Roberts
1998, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4): 73-94.

Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
1998, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1): 1-40.

Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
1997, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (3): 663-691.

Financing of Investments in Eastern Europe: A Theoretical Perspective
Bengt Holmstrom
1996, Industrial and Corporate Change, 5 (2): 205-237.

Modeling Aggregate Liquidity
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
1996, American Economic Review, 86 (2): 187-191.

Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Little Evidence
George Baker and Bengt Holmstrom
1995, American Economic Review, 85 (2): 255-259.

The Wage Policy of a Firm
George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom
1994, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), 921-955.

The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom
1994, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4), 881-919.

The Firm as an Incentive System
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
1994, American Economic Review, 84 (4): 972-991.

Market Liquidity and Performance Measurement
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
1993, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (4): 678-709.

Hierarchies and Careers: A Case Study
George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom
1993, European Economic Review, 37 (2-3): 366-378.
To access, follow this link and paste the following text into the box: doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90025-6

To the Raider Goes the Surplus: A Re-examination of the Free-rider Problem
Bengt Holmström and Barry Nalebuff
1992, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1 (1): 37-62.

Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problems: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7 (Special Issue): 24-52.

Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form
Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole
1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7 (2): 201-228.

Short Term Contracts and Long Term Agency Relationships
Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom
1990, Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1): 1-31.

Agency Costs and Innovation
Bengt Holmstrom
1989, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12 (3): 305-327.

On the Duration of Agreements
Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom
1987, International Economic Review, 28 (2): 389-406.

Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
1987, Econometrica, 55 (2): 303-328.

Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
Bengt Holmstrom and Joan Ricart I Costa
1986, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (4): 835-860.

Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications
Bengt Holmstrom and Laurence Weiss
1985, Review of Economic Studies, 52 (3): 403-425.

Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson
1983, Econometrica, 51 (6): 1799-1819.

Microeconomic Developments and Macroeconomics
Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom
1983, American Economic Review, 73 (2): 223-227.

Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts
Bengt Holmström
1983, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, Supplement: 23-54.

Moral Hazard in Teams
Bengt Holmström
1982, The Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2): 324-340.

A Theory of Wage Dynamics
Milton Harris and Bengt Holmstrom
1982, Review of Economic Studies, 49 (3): 315-333.

The Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model
Bengt Holmström   
1982, European Economic Review, 17 (2): 127-148.
doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(82)80010-X

Contractual Models of the Labor Market
Bengt Holmström
1981, American Economic Review, 71 (2): 308-313.

The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information:  Delegation and the Incentive Problem
David P. Baron and Bengt Holmström
1980, Journal of Finance, 35 (5): 1115-1138

Groves’ Scheme on Restricted Domains
Bengt Holmström
1979, Econometrica, 47 (5): 1137-1144.

Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström
1979, The Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1): 74-91.