THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES I :
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
Jean-Jacques La®ont & David Martimort
February 6, 2001

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Contents
1 Incentives in Economic Thought 17
2 The Rent Extraction-E±ciency Trade-O® 37
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints 91
4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-O®s 147
5 Incentive and Participation Contraints 183
6 Non-veri¯ability 231
7 Mixed Models 255
8 Dynamics Under Full Commitment 289
9 Limits and Extensions 321
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
9.2 Informed Principal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
9.3 Limits to Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
9.4 Dynamics and Limited Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
9.5 The Hold-Up Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
9.5.1 Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
9.5.2 Non-veri¯ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
9.6 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
9.6.1 Menu of Linear Contracts under Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . 346
9.6.2 Linear Sharing Rules and Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
9.7 Limits in the Action Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
9.7.1 Extending the Action Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
9.7.2 Costly Action Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
9.8 Limits to Rational Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
9.8.1 Trembling-Hand Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
9.8.2 Satis¯cing Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
9.8.3 Costly Communication and Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
9.9 Endogenous Information Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362