《An Empirical Equilibrium Model of a Decentralized Asset Market》

此篇是发表在2016年Econometrica上关于分散资产市场的一篇论文。 作者分析了贸易摩擦和中间商对资产配置， 资产价格，以及商业飞机市场福利的影响。

简介

I estimate a search-and-bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices, and welfare, and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business-aircraft data, I find that, relative to the Walrasian benchmark, 18.3 percent of the assets are misallocated; prices are 19.2 percent lower; and the aggregate welfare losses equal 23.9 percent. Dealers play an important role in reducing trading frictions: In a market with no dealers, a larger fraction of assets would be misallocated, and prices would be higher. However, dealers reduce aggregate welfare because their operations are costly, and they impose a negative externality by decreasing the number of agents' direct transactions.