英文文献：Behavioral and Welfare Effects of Tournaments and Fixed Performance Standard Contracts with Heterogeneous Agents: Some Experimental Evidence-锦标赛和固定绩效标准契约对异质代理的行为和福利效应:一些实验证据
英文文献作者：Wu, Steven Y.,Nazaryan, Natalie,Roe, Brian E.,Sporleder, Thomas L.
英文文献摘要：
Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Our primary findings were: (1) There is no statistical difference in average pooled effort (effort by high ability and low ability subjects are pooled together to get an aggregate average) under T and F contracts, (2) on average, effort exerted by high ability agents is considerably higher than effort exerted by low ability agents under both types of contracts, (3) average pooled payoff for the subjects is affected by the type of contract used. Statistical analysis of the results revealed that high ability subjects generally benefit from tournaments whereas low ability agents are harmed by tournaments. Only in the case where common shocks are dominant would low ability agents not be negatively impacted by tournaments.

实验经济学被用来比较锦标赛(T)和固定绩效合同(F)时，代理有异质成本。我们的主要发现:(1)平均集中精力没有统计学差异(努力高能力和低能力科目组合在一起得到一个总平均水平)下F T和合同,(2)平均努力施加高代理能力大大高于努力施加低能力代理两种类型的合同,(3)池平均回报为研究对象使用的合同类型的影响。统计分析结果显示，高能力主体普遍受益于锦标赛，而低能力主体则受到锦标赛的损害。只有在共同冲击占主导地位的情况下，低能力代理人才不会受到锦标赛的负面影响。